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CRIMINAL LAW
Out of the Quagmire After Jacobson v. United




The entrapment defense is a seldom used, but often touted, re-
tort to criminal prosecutions, particularly where law enforcement
officers have employed persuasive techniques to secure participa-
tion in proscribed activity. Aside from examinations of notorious
cases, I little attention has been given to this means of avoiding crim-
inal responsibility. 2 However, as the focus on drug-related offenses
intensifies and enforcement methods increase in sophistication, the
doctrine of entrapment may become a more critical factor in crimi-
nal procedure. As the "war on drugs" has escalated, government
* Associate Professor, Georgia State University. J.D., Georgia State University,
1993. Ph.D., Claremont Graduate School, 1981. M.S., Georgia State University, 1975.
B.S., Georgia State University, 1971.
1 would like to thank Professor Anne S. Emanuel of the Georgia State University
College of Law for her invaluable assistance in reviewing early drafts of this article, and
to acknowledge Lynn Weisberg and Dave Ellis for their thoughtful insight in refining
some of the major concepts contained herein.
I Two of the more notorious sting operations were Abscam and the case of John
DeLorean. The former involved a standard FBI undercover scheme to recover stolen
art work and securities that developed into a bribery investigation resulting in the con-
viction of seven congressmen and a host of other various officials. Seeparticularly United
States v. Kelley, 707 F.2d 1460, 1461 (D.C. Cir. 1983), and Bennett L. Gershman, Ab-
scam, the Judiciary, and the Ethics of Entrapment, 91 YALE L.J. 1565, 1565 (1982). The latter
involved an FBI operation, in which an automobile entrepreneur became involved in a
major drug transaction ostensibly to save his ailing manufacturing business. Thejury in
DeLorean's trial found that the government had entrapped the defendant and acquitted
him. See Maura FJ. Whelan, Lead Us Not Into (Unwarranted) Temptation: A Proposal to Re-
place the Entrapment Defense with a Reasonable Suspicion Requirement, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 1193,
1193 (1985).




agents have turned to more cogent techniques to apprehend deal-
ers; ensnared defendants have then resorted to the use of the en-
trapment defense to combat these more sophisticated efforts. As it
is currently structured, however, the entrapment defense is incapa-
ble of dealing with these new methods.
This impotence is particularly acute in the area of the "reverse
sting" or "reverse buy." Unlike the traditional "sting," where un-
dercover officers pose as buyers of illicit goods or services, in the
"reverse sting," law enforcement personnel act as sellers. Agents
use various techniques to promote the sale of illegal services or
goods such as felony-sized quantities of narcotics. Upon consum-
mation of the sale, perpetrators are arrested for such offenses as
possession with intent to distribute, or in the case of federal of-
fenses, attempting to possess controlled substances. 3
With the traditional sting, where government agents offer to
purchase contraband from a defendant, the entrapment defense
provides a workable mechanism to determine whether criminal lia-
bility will attach in the federal courts. In these cases, entrapment
hinges on predisposition, which is the defendant's inclination to
commit an offense prior to engaging in the criminal conduct. Pro-
clivity to engage in criminal conduct is difficult to deny when a de-
fendant actually provides contraband to an enforcement agent.
Because predisposition is evident, or at least arguably present, the
techniques of inducement used by enforcement personnel to secure
a transaction become largely insignificant.4 In the context of re-
verse stings and other variations of the traditional sting, however,
the issue is far less clear-cut. The notion of predisposition becomes
a significant issue, and the role of enforcement officers in securing
cooperation becomes critical.
This article will demonstrate that traditional approaches to the
entrapment defense are either unworkable in practice or unjust in
result. The United States Supreme Court's recent attempt to re-
solve the confusion viaJacobson v. United States5 only added to the
3 Because of Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) guidelines, which prohibit
illegal narcotics from being placed into the hands of a suspect under investigation, fed-
eral agents cannot arrest suspects for possession of controlled substances. Instead,
would-be drug buyers are prosecuted for attempting or conspiring (21 U.S.C. § 846) to
possess controlled substances (21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)).
4 There are some notable exceptions to this general rule, not the least of which are
the two most significant historical cases in this area: Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S.
435 (1932), and Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958). While these decisions
represent the core of the philosophy behind the current federal approach, neither typify
the common "sting" operation. See infra notes 36-62 and accompanying text.
5 Jacobson v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1535 (1992).
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quagmire. This discussion will begin by describing the concept of
the "sting" operation and its variations throughout law enforce-
ment. The entrapment defense will be examined, specifically the
two major approaches currently used (subjective and objective) to
determine entrapment, and the unique problems the reverse sting
poses for the entrapment issue. This analysis will conclude that cur-
rent methods of determining entrapment are simply unworkable,
and a new strategy is needed. Finally, this article will offer a new
proposal, which combines both the traditional objective and subjec-
tive approaches. The concept involves a balancing of governmental
impropriety (most often associated with the objective approach)
against offender predisposition (usually found central to the subjec-
tive view). Under this proposal, the defendant can raise the entrap-
ment defense only when some type of governmental impropriety is
present. Once so found by the court, evidence of the improper ac-
tion would be submitted to the jury, along with facts relating to the
defendant's predisposition to commit the offense. The jury would
then be charged with finding entrapment if the government's im-
proper behavior outweighed the defendants' proclivity to engage in
the misconduct.
I. THE WORLD OF "STINGS"
Sting operations have been popular among enforcement per-
sonnel for almost two decades. Initially, stings were used primarily
to snare burglars and other thieves. In the early 1970s, undercover
officers began setting up false business operations which were pur-
portedly establishments where stolen merchandise could be
"fenced." 6 Often utilizing funds provided by the federal govern-
ment through the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration
(LEAA), officers would "engage in the business of buying stolen
goods. After a short period, the officers [would] obtain indictments
against the criminals who [had] sold them the stolen goods, and a
large number of criminals [would] then be rounded up 7 at about the
6 The practice of government officers establishing crime-related fronts in order to
lure offenders into engaging in illegal enterprises has been in the law enforcement arse-
nal for some time. In the traditional "sting" operation, law enforcement officers often
establish a front, such as a business for the illegal "fencing" of stolen property. Then,
often relying solely on word-of-mouth, they begin to purchase merchandise, usually
from local burglars and other larceny offenders. Videos are normally made of the oper-
ation, and a grand jury issues indictments based on the evidence presented.
7 Sometimes these "round-ups" would net unintended bystanders. Such was the
case when on February 5, 1985, after a joint operation between the FBI, DEA, and the
Georgia Bureau of Investigation, enforcement officials threw a private "party" at an ex-
clusive Buckhead Club in Atlanta, Georgia, for individuals who had been secretly in-
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same time." 8 In 1976, LEAA reported that twelve sting operations
had netted over 1300 arrests and recovered almost $26 million in
stolen property. With many of the transactions on video tape, it was
estimated that the conviction rate reached almost 95 percent.9
The use of the "reverse sting" as a law enforcement tool seems
to be a relatively new strategy. The concept, which involves the en-
couragement of would-be offenders to participate in a criminal
event staged by officials, surfaced in the early 1980s under the no-
menclature of the "reverse buy" or the "buy/bust" in drug cases.' 0
Like its counterpart, the traditional sting, the reverse sting involves
the enticement of offenders into a criminal enterprise. In the re-
verse sting, however, the would-be offender buys illicit goods or
services that are offered by the government; thus the purchaser vio-
lates the law by accepting the offer." Abscam and the pursuit of
John DeLorean are perhaps the most notorious federal reverse sting
operations.
Abscam, so named for the FBI front organization, Abdul Enter-
prises, initially involved a typical "sting" operation that targeted
stolen art and securities. However, shortly after the operation be-
gan, two individuals approached undercover FBI agents, who were
posing as representatives of wealthy Arab investors, about financing
equipment purchases, which would include bribing local officials.
This led to a "reversal" of the operation and the uncovering of cor-
ruption in the Immigration and Naturalization Service and eventu-
ally resulted in the conviction of seven congressmen.' 2
The case of John DeLorean involved a reverse sting operation,
which was adjusted after it began in order to maintain DeLorean as
a principal target. DeLorean, whose ailing motor company needed
an infusion of cash, was approached by a "former neighbor and oc-
dicted. Among those inadvertently arrested was then Assistant Chief Eldrin Bell of the
Atlanta Police Department. David Craig, Deputy ChiefEldrin Bell Demoted, ATLANTA CON-
sTrrTION, Feb. 6, 1985, at A14.
8 JOSEPH DELADURANTEY & DANIEL SULLIVAN, CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION STANDARDS
(1980).
9 David Pike, 12 Sting Operations Recover More Than $26 Million, 6 LEAA Newsl. 9,
Apr. 1977, at 8.
10 See, e.g., United States v. Pennell, 737 F.2d 521, 523 (6th Cir. 1984) (defendant
paid some $43,000 in cash to DEA agents for two pounds of what he believed to be
cocaine).
11 The Eleventh Circuit defines it this way: "In this type of undercover narcotics
operation, known as a 'reverse sting,' undercover law enforcement officers pose as sell-
ers of previously confiscated drugs, set up deals with would-be buyers under carefully
controlled conditions, and arrest the purchasers following the sale." United States v.
Walther, 867 F.2d 1334, 1335 (11 th Cir. 1989).
12 See United States v. Kelley, 707 F.2d 1460, 1461 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
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casional narcotics dealer."' 3 He was allegedly invited to participate
in the financing of a major cocaine deal, which involved an invest-
ment of some $2 million on DeLorean's part and could net him as
much as $60 million. When DeLorean could not raise the capital,
the plan changed so that he only had to put up collateral. A jury
acquitted DeLorean based on his entrapment defense and the gov-
ernment's failure to prove its case. 14 DeLorean's case gained noto-
riety as an example of intolerance of overbroad governmental
activity, particularly as it related to reverse sting operations. 15
The DeLorean case closely resembles a variation of the reverse
sting, which has been characterized as a "take back" or "circular
sting." In this situation, government agents act as both seller and
buyer with the target individual acting as an intermediary. An early
case was United States v. Bueno, 16 where the defendant, a narcotics
addict, was approached by another addict who was actually an in-
former working for the federal government. The informant
purchased heroin in Mexico, smuggled it into the United States, and
then made arrangements for the defendant to sell the heroin to a
government agent posing as a buyer.' 7 The agent purchased heroin
twice from the defendant, who was arrested and convicted for sell-
ing narcotics.' 8
13 Whelan, supra note 1, at 1198.
14 Id. at 1199.
15 Although there is some dispute over DeLorean's role as the originator of the ini-
tial contact, thereby casting doubt on his predisposition, the jury seemed to be more
concerned with the government's behavior than DeLorean's proclivity. According to
juror accounts, the jury appeared to have ignored the court's standard "subjective ap-
proach" entrapment instructions, which the defense requested and chief defense attor-
ney Howard L. Weitzman "eloquently pleaded" in the closing arguments. Katherine
Macdonald, NOT GUILTY: Verdict's Effect On "Stings" Eyed, WASH. PosT, Aug. 17, 1984,
at Al. Thejury appeared to have acquitted DeLorean because of the impropriety of the
government's action, and not DeLorean's predisposition to commit the offense. Accord-
ing to one account, "Weitzman said that jurors 'didn't like the case, they didn't like what
happened.' The jurors intended, he said, 'to send a message to the public and to the
system at large that this is the beginning of a new era in law enforcement .... Our
citizens will not tolerate this type of conduct, setting up people." Id. As another report
stated, "the defense, in effect, put the Government's undercover investigative methods
on trial." Judith Cummings, DeLorean is Freed of Cocaine Charge by FederalJury, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 17, 1984, at Al. See also Whelan, supra note 1, at 1199-1200.
16 United States v. Bueno, 447 F.2d 903, 904 (5th Cir. 1971).
17 The informer told the defendant that he needed assistance because he had already
"burned" the buyer by selling him a substantially diluted product. Id.
18 The court reversed the conviction on the basis of entrapment, holding that unless
the government could rebut the defendant's version of the facts, the conviction was
barred as a matter of law. The court seemed to be most troubled by the defendant's
version of the facts:
If this testimony is true, it is quite apparent that the heroin was purchased in Mexico
with the government informer's money and credit. It is further apparent that the
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Since Bueno, a number of cases involving reverse and circular
stings have been reported. Many have involved the sale of narcotics
but others, like Jacobson v. United States,19 entailed other activities,
such as the purchase of child pornography. The central theme in all
of these cases echoes the concerns expressed by the Bueno court: the
facts involve the government buying contraband from itself through
an intermediary, the defendant, and then charging that person with
the crime. 20 As the Fifth Circuit discovered in Bueno, the entrap-
ment defense and the willingness of a defendant to participate in the
sale, "which is common to the usual entrapment defense, is no an-
swer." 21 Entrapment as it is currently structured in the federal
courts simply does not address the issue properly.
II. ENTRAPMENT AS A DEFENSE TO CONDUCT
A. THE ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE IN GENERAL
Entrapment is considered a member of the family of affirmative
defenses. 22 Broadly speaking, this family includes a variety of mech-
anisms whereby criminal liability is waived because of some compel-
ling reason asserted by the defendant. Generally, this family
includes two categories: the justification branch and the excuse
branch.23 The former incorporates grounds such as self-defense
and the defense of persons and property. A defendant who raises
such a defense does not deny committing a criminal act but, in an
heroin was smuggled into the United States by the Informer. The story takes on the
element of the government buying heroin from itself, through an intermediary, the
defendant, and then charging him with the crime. This greatly exceeds the bounds
of reason stated by this court in Williamson v. United States, 311 F.2d 441 (5th Cir.
1962).
Bueno, 447 F.2d at 905.
19 112 S. Ct. 1535, 1537 (1992).
20 Bueno, 447 F.2d at 905.
21 The court went on to say:
In such cases where the issue is willingness or unwillingness of the defendant, the
defense becomes a jury question because the sale itself constitutes evidence of will-
ingness contrary to the defense of unwillingness. The issue there [in traditional
entrapment cases] is not what he did but why he did it, i.e., because of coercion.
The issue here is what he did, i.e., taking heroin from one government agent and
selling it to another. The government's case cannot rest on the mere fact that he
entered into the Informer's plan willingly.
Id. at 906.
22 See MARCUS, supra note 2, § 1.03; WAYNE LAFAVE & AUSTIN ScoTr, CRIMINAL LAW
§ 5.2 (1986).
23 While few commentators directly address this concept, most tend to either lump
defenses to criminal conduct into one broad category of "Justification and Excuse" like
LAFAvE & Scorr, id. § 5, or they separate certain "Special Defenses" from acts that limit
a defendant's criminal responsibility, as does ROLLIN PERKINS, PERKINS ON CRIMINAL
LAw §§ 9, 10 (1957). Others abandon any attempt to classify defenses. See SUE REID,
CRIMINAL LAw 67-69 (2d ed. 1992).
ENTRAPMENT STANDARD
attempt to obviate responsibility, claims that the conduct was justi-
fied by certain circumstances outside the defendant's control. In
other words, the defendant stipulates to the intent to commit the act
but defends the act based on circumstances that would cause a rea-
sonably prudent person to do likewise. Thus, the conduct is consid-
ered justified in the eyes of the law.
The justification asserted most often is self-defense. Under this
defense, if the accused reasonably believes that danger of death or
serious injury is imminent, then the force necessary to repel an at-
tack is justified.24 The rationale for this justification is that it is only
"just" to allow someone who is placed in danger to take necessary
protective measures, 25 even those which otherwise constitute crimi-
nal acts. Self-defense is also based on the notion that the defensive
act will promote social good, in that protecting one's self from at-
tack is the proper course of conduct. 26 The same policy could apply
to prevention of a crime and the defense of property, although there
are limitations to the options available in these areas. 27
The other side of the defense family consists of "excuses," in
which the defendant either lacks the requisite intent (mens rea), or
intent is excused due to mitigating circumstances. 28 The defenses
of age and "insanity" fit the first strand, while the doctrines of ne-
cessity and duress fit the second. Under the defenses of age and, to
an extent, insanity, the defendant claims to lack the means to form a
critical portion of the corpus delicti, mens rea.29 While there is evi-
dence of guilty conduct (the defendant generally admits to the crim-
inal act), there is uncertainty as to whether the accused possessed a
24 State v. Goodseal, 183 N.W.2d 258, 263 (Neb. 1971).
25 LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 22, § 5.7.
26 See JOSHuA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAw 199 (1987).
27 In the area of crime prevention, or "law enforcement" as it is sometimes called,
the Supreme Court in Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8 (1985), held that the use of
deadly force to stop a fleeing felon was excessive unless it is considered "reasonable"
under the Fourth Amendment. Generally, reasonableness includes knowledge that the
felon committed a violent crime or reason to believe that the suspect will commit a vio-
lent crime. As to the defense of property, case law has evolved in this area to the point
where preventive techniques generally must be non-life threatening unless serious vio-
lent felonies are involved. See People v. Ceballos, 526 P.2d 241, 245 (Cal. 1974).
28 DRESSLER, supra note 26, at 199.
29 Mens rea, or criminal intent as it is more commonly known, is one of the three basic
requirements for criminal responsibility. Known also as the corpus delicti, the "body of
the crime" consists of three parts. First, the defendant must have engaged in an actus
reus ("guilty act") that is prohibited by the criminal law. Second, the defendant must
have a guilty mind (mens rea), meaning that the defendant intended the untoward conse-
quences. Finally, there must be some causal connection between the two. Put another
way, the guilty mind put the guilty act into motion. For a detailed seven-point system,
see JEROME HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 47 (2d ed. 1947).
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"guilty mind" at the time of the crime. Society excuses such con-
duct because to do otherwise would hold an incompetent person
responsible for a crime.30
Under the defenses of necessity and duress, a defendant is re-
leased from responsibility for an otherwise criminal act because a
greater evil would have resulted had the accused not acted. Here,
the defendant has the requisite intent to be held accountable, but
the conduct is excused because it represents the lesser of the two
evils. However, unlike self-defense, excuses such as duress or com-
pulsion lack the element of social good that would allow for the jus-
tification of the proscribed conduct.3' To illustrate, society is
willing to justify the act of a person who, while under attack, kills
someone else in self-defense. The social good derives from the sur-
vival of the righteous individual over the wanton. With duress, on
the other hand, it is more difficult to "justify" the perpetration of a
fraud by a bank president because a member of his family is held
hostage by a malefactor. In this latter example, society is willing to
excuse (not justify) the conduct because the alternative would per-
petrate a greater harm (not provide for a greater good).
The defense of entrapment, unfortunately, does not fit comfort-
ably into either family, although it has characteristics of both. Like
self-defense, entrapment assumes that the accused fully intended to
commit the proscribed acts. Likewise, the accused is thrust into cir-
cumstances brought about by another party, which at least encour-
ages criminal behavior. It is at this point that the two defenses part
company because, unlike self-defense, where protecting one's self is
the better course of conduct, there is no such justification for
entrapment.
Entrapment also can be aligned partially with the excuse de-
fenses. If a defendant was duped into participating in a criminal act
and thus lacked predisposition, then it could be argued that there
was no criminal intent. However, if predisposition is not required,
then entrapment loses its appeal as an "excuse" for criminal
conduct.32
The fact that entrapment is neither fish (justification) nor fowl
(excuse) may explain why it generates such controversy and conster-
nation when it is applied. It is difficult to use entrapment to "jus-
tify" a criminal act because it would be neither "just," nor would it
30 LAFAVE & Scor, supra note 22, at 308.
31 See PERKINS, supra note 23, at 840.
32 This latter argument is frequently cited as the foundation for the objective ap-
proach to entrapment, whereas the former is most often associated with the subjective
approach. Both are discussed in detail, see infra notes 36-92 and accompanying text.
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promote some social good. It is also difficult to "excuse" crime
through the entrapment defense. While it would be possible to ar-
gue that a defendant who was not predisposed to commit the crime
lacked the requisite intent to be held accountable, it is difficult to
contend that the defendant is excused because of some greater evil,
like improper government conduct.33
Some independent policy explanation therefore must support
entrapment. Such a public policy rationale emerges from two inter-
related questions, both of which are tied closely to the basic concept
that the activities of government officials caused the defendant to
engage in criminal behavior.3 4 The first policy question is whether
the government should be allowed to engage in clearly improper
and often illegal behavior to carry out its law enforcement mission.
The second issue concerns allowing the government to manufacture
crime that might not otherwise occur. These policy issues are inter-
twined with the two major legal approaches to entrapment.3 5
B. APPROACHES TO ENTRAPMENT
There are two generally recognized approaches which various
jurisdictions take toward the defense of entrapment: the subjective,
or predisposition, avenue taken by the federal government and a
majority of states, and the objective, or government instigation, ap-
proach that has been adopted by otherjurisdictions. Under the sub-
33 This "homelessness" may be linked to the bifurcated view of the defense. Entrap-
ment, according to the "objective" view, might be justified because this approach treats
the defendant's predisposition as irrelevant and instead concentrates on government
conduct. The opposite effects result when the "subjective" approach is taken in cases
where the entrapment defense is available only to defendants who are not predisposed.
Crime could never be "justified" according to the subjective view because the defendant
lacks the requisite intent to engage in the conduct. The defense is only partly welcome
in the excuse side of the family as well. Here, the results are just the opposite, depend-
ing on which view of entrapment is used. According to the objective view, entrapment
would never be excused because to do so would require ignoring intent. On the other
hand, if the subjective view of entrapment is taken, conduct could be excused if the
defendant was not predisposed to commit the act.
34 These explanations for entrapment are extrapolated from the general justifica-
tions, which are normally associated with the two primary approaches to this defense:
the subjective approach and the objective approach. Both views of entrapment will be
examined more closely later along with the justifications which support each approach.
35 The first question is obviously tied to the objective approach but is closely related
to the subjective strategy as well. The defendant's predisposition not to commit the
crime, by definition, should be unaffected by "normal"/non-intrusive government be-
havior. Otherwise, the defendant would not be predisposed. As such, this question can
equally apply to either approach. The second question is somewhat related to the tradi-
tional explanation for the subjective approach: government-instigated crimes are not
thought to be the objects of proscription in penal codes, but it is also tied to the objec-
tive approach. See Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
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jective approach, the salient factor is the defendant's predisposition
to commit the crime in question. According to the objective view,
predisposition is irrelevant. Rather, the objective approach focuses
on the conduct of government officials. This article will next discuss
each of these approaches in turn.
1. Subjective Approach
The subjective approach, also known as the Sorrells-Sherman doc-
trine,3 6 entails a two-step test where the threshold requirement is
government instigation of a criminal offense. Once this level of in-
volvement has been found, 37 the focus shifts to whether an "other-
wise innocent" party has been lured into the commission of a
crime.38 The primary focus of attention under the subjective view is
whether the particular defendant in question was "predisposed" to
committing the crime prior to government instigation.3 9
There are two primary justifications for the subjective ap-
proach. The first involves the public policy argument expressed by
Chief Justice Hughes in Sorrells v. United States. In this Prohibition
Era case, the Court held that the jury should have been allowed to
consider an entrapment defense after a revenue agent, posing as a
furniture salesman and war veteran, repeatedly asked the defendant
to secure liquor for him as a personal favor.40 The Court based its
ruling in part on its belief that the evidence supported the defend-
ant's claim that he was not predisposed to commit the offense 4' and
that it was against public policy to convict such non-disposed par-
ties. This position was buttressed by the conclusion that "it was
[not] the intention of the Congress in enacting [the National Prohi-
bition Act] that its processes of detection and enforcement should
be abused by the instigation by government officials of an act on the
part of persons otherwise innocent in order to lure them to its com-
36 So named for Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932), and Sherman v.
United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
37 It should be noted that the Court in both Sherman and Sorrells stated that when the
government merely provided the opportunity, this threshold was not met.
38 Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 448.
39 Id. at 451; Sherman, 356 U.S. at 372.
40 Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 452.
41 As to predisposition, the majority said:
It is clear that the evidence was sufficient to warrant a finding that the act for which
defendant was prosecuted was instigated by the prohibition agent, that it was the
creature of his purpose, that defendant had no previous disposition to commit it but
was an industrious, law-abiding citizen, and that the agent lured defendant, other-
wise innocent, to its commission by repeated and persistent solicitation in which he
succeeded by taking advantage of the sentiment aroused by reminiscences of their




mission and to punish them." 42 In other words, convictions secured
via entrapment should not be sustained by the courts because they
involve activities not targeted by the legislation.
In Sherman v. United States, the Court affirmed the Sorrells ration-
ale and reiterated that "[t]he function of law enforcement is the pre-
vention of crime and the apprehension of criminals. Manifestly, that
function does not include the manufacturing of crime." 43 The
Court ruled that entrapment was established as a matter of law
where a recovering narcotics addict reluctantly supplied drugs to a
government informer. Basing this decision on the injustice of the
government activities, Chief Justice Warren pointed out:
The case at bar illustrates an evil which the defense of entrapment is
designed to overcome. The government informer entices someone at-
tempting to avoid narcotics not only into carrying out an illegal sale
but also into returning to the habit of use. Selecting the proper time,
the informer then tells the government agent. The set-up is accepted
by the agent without even a question as to the manner in which the
informer encountered the seller. Thus the Government plays on the
weaknesses of an innocent party and beguiles him into committing
crimes which he otherwise would not have attempted. Law enforce-
ment does not require methods such as this.44
Therefore, under the subjective view, entrapment is to be avoided
for two reasons. First, non-predisposed parties are not targets of
criminal statutes. Second, justice demands that enforcement of-
ficers not manufacture crime by involving otherwise innocent peo-
ple in criminal activities.
The Court upheld the subjective standard in United States v. Rus-
sell.4 5 In this case, Justice Rehnquist, representing a divided Court,
reaffirmed Sorrells and Sherman and the principle consideration of the
"defendant's predisposition to commit the crime." 46 In Russell, the
government supplied the defendant with an ingredient necessary to
the manufacturing of the controlled substance, methamphetamine
or "speed," and subsequently arrested him. The Court was unwill-
ing to hold that this government involvement amounted to entrap-
ment based on improper actions, stating that "[it is only when the
government's deception actually implants the criminal design in the
mind of the defendant that the defense of entrapment comes into
play." 47
42 Id. at 448.
43 Sherman, 356 U.S. at 372.
44 Id. at 376.
45 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
46 Id. at 433.
47 Id. at 436. The Court did recognize that, notwithstanding the defendant's predis-
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The Court confronted a potential due process claim in Hampton
v. United States,48 upholding the conviction of an admittedly predis-
posed suspect who bought heroin from a government informer and
then sold it to an agent. There was no majority opinion in Hampton,
but the plurality and concurring opinions apparently agreed that
any due process claim should be considered separately from a re-
view of entrapment.49 In Mathews v. United States,50 the Court once
again upheld Sorrells through Hampton, and endorsed the notion that
"predisposition [is the] 'principal element in the defense of entrap-
ment,' [in that it] focuses upon whether the defendant was an 'un-
wary innocent' or instead, an 'unwary criminal' who readily availed
himself of the opportunity to perpetrate the crime." 5 1
Appellate examinations of predisposition in reverse-sting oper-
ations have been limited. This is probably due in part to the fact
that predisposition is a question of fact to be determined by the
jury. 52 Successful entrapment defenses are never appealed (and thus
never reported) and thwarted entrapment defenses are often af-
firmed as jury findings not subject to review.53 In addition, defend-
ants who have a legitimate entrapment claim may be reluctant to
raise the defense because of the specter of past conduct. In proving
that a defendant was predisposed, federal prosecutors are given
wide latitude to present damaging character evidence.54 Predisposi-
tion is therefore either relatively easy to establish or, once con-
position, the government could "go too far," thereby violating standards of due process,
but held that it had not done so in the present case.
48 425 U.S. 484 (1976).
49 The Third Circuit applied a due process test in United States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d
373 (3d Cir. 1978), ruling that the government had gone too far when it enticed two
defendants into a "speed" manufacturing scheme similar to that found in Russell, but
where neither defendant was essential to the plan.
50 485 U.S. 58 (1988).
51 Id. at 61 (quoting Russell, 411 U.S. at 433, 436, and Sherman, 356 U.S. at 372).
52 See Paul Marcus, Proving Entrapment Under the Predisposition Test, 14 AM. J. CRIM. L.
53 (1987).
53 See, e.g., United States v. Sayers, 698 F.2d 1128 (11th Cir. 1983), which summarily
approved of the jury's rejection of an entrapment defense based on the evidence
presented on predisposition. See also United States v. Wylie, 625 F.2d 1371, 1377 (9th
Cir. 1980), in which the court characterized a jury nullification of the entrapment de-
fense this way: "By convicting the defendants, the jury obviously rejected the entrap-
ment defense and thereby found that the defendants had been predisposed to commit
the crimes." Id. at 1377.
54 In United States v. Roper, 874 F.2d 782 (11th Cir. 1989), the Eleventh Circuit
allowed the prosecution to bring up the defendant's past activities as evidence of predis-
position in a reverse sting, which started in New Mexico and ended in Alabama with the
defendant's arrests on conspiracy charges. The court gave the prosecutor a great deal of
latitude in bringing up past conduct because the entrapment defense had been raised.
The jury apparently rejected the defendant's claim that he was not predisposed and
found him guilty. The court repudiated the defendant's protestation of the prejudicial
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firmed, devastating to the defendant. 55
In an attempt to avoid some of the problems posed by predis-
position, some defendants have contended that they were entrapped
as a matter of law. According to this argument, the defendant states
that without prima facie evidence of predisposition, the case cannot
go to the jury. When the courts have addressed this predisposition
approach in the context of a reverse sting, little clarity has
emerged. 56 Two federal circuits have addressed the issue directly.
The Ninth Circuit has established a five-factor test to determine pre-
disposition,5 7 which focuses on the defendant's reluctance to en-
gage in the crime.58 The Fifth Circuit takes a different approach to
information that was paraded before the jury, stating that it was permissible if needed to
prove predisposition.
55 The D.C. Circuit offers a more elaborate explanation in United States v. Whoie,
925 F.2d 1481 (D.C. Cir. 1991), in which the court described two different approaches
to predisposition.
In unitary-approach jurisdictions, a defendant who claims he was entrapped
must produce evidence to the judge both of government persuasion and of his own
"non-predisposition." [Citation omitted.] If the defendant carries his burden of
production before the judge, the government bears the burden of persuading the
jury "that it did not entrap the defendant." In jurisdictions following the "bifur-
cated approach," in contrast, the jury, not the judge, decides whether the defendant
has carried his burden of proving inducement, not just producing evidence of it. If
the defendant has met his burden, the jury then goes on to decide whether the
government has met its burden of proving predisposition.
Id. at 1483.
56 The U.S. Supreme Court has addressed the concept of "entrapment as a matter of
law" several times. In United States v. Sherman, 356 U.S. 369, 372 (1958), the Court
ruled that such was the case when government agents beguiled an otherwise innocent
person into committing a criminal offense. More recently, inJacobson v. United States,
112 S. Ct. 1535 (1992), the Court ruled that a defendant was not predisposed as a mat-
ter of law and thus the case should not have gone to the jury. See infra note 102.
57 The five factors include: (1) the defendant's character or reputation; (2) whether
the government initially suggested the criminal activity; (3) whether the defendant was
motivated by profit; (4) whether there was any reluctance on the part of the defendant;
and (5) the overall nature of the governmental inducement. While no single factor con-
trols, emphasis is often placed on defendant reluctance. United States v. Hsieh Hui Mei
Chen, 754 F.2d 817, 821 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1139 (1985).
58 This general entrapment predisposition test was applied to a reverse-sting case in
United States v. Wegman, 917 F.2d 1307 (9th Cir. 1990) (text in WESTLAW). In this
case, United States Customs agents sent the defendant an unsolicited one-page adver-
tisement offering photographs of boys and girls engaged in sexual conduct. Wegman
responded with an order, a request for information on larger pictures, and an offer to
sell publication rights to a book on "child love." Agents followed up by filling Weg-
man's order and with correspondence concerning the book. They eventually conducted
a search of his house and recovered the "sting" photographs, as well as others, and
additional material relating to child pornography. Wegman claimed that he was en-
trapped as a "matter of law" because there was insufficient evidence that would have
convinced a reasonable juror that he was predisposed to commit the crime. The court
disagreed. After reviewing the five-factor test, it concluded that "[n]othing in the record
suggests that Wegman exhibited any reluctance to receive photographs of minors en-
gaged in sexually explicit conduct [thus] there was sufficient evidence for a rational trier
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entrapment by allowing the defendant to focus on the specific state
of mind required for the offense to demonstrate predisposition. 59
Predisposition, therefore, may pose more problems than it resolves
in cases where reverse stings are implicated. Predisposition is easy
for the prosecution to prove, and it is quite likely that the govern-
ment will parade evidence of any prior conduct before the jury in
doing so. In an attempt to avoid these pitfalls, some defendants
have argued that they were entrapped as a matter of law, but the
courts have been relatively unsympathetic. 60 Regardless, if predis-
position appears to be present, then, entrapment is an ineffective
remedy under the subjective view.6 ' As such, some defendants in-
of fact to conclude that Wegman was predisposed to commit the crime." Id. Although
the initial contact which led to the bogus sale was initiated by government agents, the
court found sufficient evidence of predisposition to send it to a jury.
59 In United States v. Newman, 849 F.2d 156 (5th Cir. 1988), the court held that
when an entrapment defense is raised, a defendant can introduce expert psychiatric tes-
timony that indicates peculiar susceptibility to inducement. The circuit court examined
this factor in the reverse-sting decision of United States v. Nunn, 940 F.2d 1148 (5th Cir.
1991). In this drug case that involved a huge operation netting over $600,000 a week,
Nunn claimed that he was unduly influenced by his domineering father, Ralph Duke.
The trial court denied the defendant's request that expert psychiatric testimony on his
susceptibility to influence be admitted into evidence. The Fifth Circuit found that the
trial court had not abused its discretion when it denied the request, particularly in light
of overwhelming independent evidence of predisposition. See also United States v. Duke,
940 F.2d 1117 (5th Cir. 1991), a companion case involving Nunn's father, Ralph
Chavous "Plukey" Duke. Court reports do not explain the difference in last names be-
tween Duke and Nunn.
60 Defendants have received mixed results at the circuit level from claims of entrap-
ment as a matter of law. Reversals in this area include: Jacobson v. United States, 112 S.
Ct. 1535 (1992); United States v. Skarie, 971 F.2d 317 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v.
Dion, 762 F.2d 674 (8th Cir. 1985); United States v. Lard, 734 F.2d 1290 (8th Cir.
1984); United States v. Bueno, 447 F.2d 903 (5th Cir. 1971); Greene v. United States,
454 F.2d 783 (9th Cir. 1971). However, convictions have been confirmed in more cases:
United States v. Nelson, 847 F.2d 285 (6th Cir. 1988); United States v. Irving, 827 F.2d
390 (8th Cir. 1987); United States v. Nixon, 777 F.2d 958 (5th Cir. 1985); United States
v. So, 755 F.2d 1350 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v. Pennell, 737 F.2d 521 (6th Cir.
1984); United States v. Thoma, 726 F.2d 1191 (7th Cir. 1984); United States v. Kamin-
ski, 703 F.2d 1004 (7th Cir. 1983); United States v. Sayers, 698 F.2d 1128 (11 th Cir.
1983); United States v. McCaghren, 666 F.2d 1227 (8th Cir. 1981); and United States v.
Townsend, 555 F.2d 152 (7th Cir. 1977).
61 This is not to say that predisposition is never examined in detail. At times, de-
fendants raise questions about their lack of intent, often citing bizarre circumstances or
explanations. Such was the case in United States v. Pennell, 737 F.2d 521 (6th Cir.
1984), in which the defendant claimed that he believed that he was acting as a govern-
ment agent and submitted evidence that he had been previously employed as a confiden-
tial informant. The court, however, rejected his claim, choosing to believe the
government's version of the facts instead. A similar and perhaps more substantiated
claim was rejected in United States v. Nixon, 777 F.2d 958 (5th Cir. 1985), discussed
infra. Finally, the Third Circuit rejected a claim of no predisposition in United States v.
Castro, 776 F.2d 1118 (3d Cir. 1985), in which the defendant maintained that he was at
the scene of an initial discussion simply as a translator.
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stead have attempted to utilize a due process/outrageous conduct
claim.6 2
2. The Objective Approach
The objective approach focuses upon government misbehavior
and ignores predisposition. This strategy, which is supported by a
majority of commentators63 and the Model Penal Code,64 has been
adopted in sixteen states either by the legislature or via caselaw in
state court.6 5 When government agents employ "methods of per-
suasion or inducement which create a substantial risk that such an
offense will be committed by persons other than those who are
ready to commit it, entrapment has been employed."' 66 In Califor-
nia, this concept is defined as conduct "likely to induce a normally
law-abiding person to commit [a crime]."' 67 Under both views, the
presumption is that an ordinary reasonable person would not have
engaged in the criminal behavior if not for the "overbearing con-
duct" of enforcement officers.6 Suspect conduct may include "ap-
peals to sympathy or friendship, offers of inordinate gain, or
62 This strategy is not part of the subjective view of entrapment as clearly stated in
Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484 (1976). However, a number of courts have
addressed this concept particularly in reverse-sting operations. Because the notion of
"outrageous conduct" is so clearly linked to the objective view of entrapment, it will be
discussed at the end of the next subsection.
63 LAFAVE & Scorr, supra note 22, § 5.2(c), support this conclusion by listing seven
different sources, including LAWRENCE P. TIFFANY ET AL., DETECTION OF CRIME 265-73
(1967); Joseph Goldstein, For Harold Lasswell: Some Reflections on Human Dignity, Entrap-
ment, Informed Consent, and the Plea Bargain, 84 YALE LJ. 683 (1975), and Paul W. Williams,
The Defense of Entrapment and Related Problems in Criminal Procedure, 28 FORDHAM L. REV.
399 (1959).
64 MODEL PENAL CODE, § 2.13 (1985).
65 Technically, only 15 states have adopted the Model Penal Code approach.
Although the California Supreme Court stated in People v. Barraza, 591 P.2d 949 (Cal.
1979), that the state had adopted a combination of the two approaches, a close reading
of the case reveals that the objective view of entrapment controls. Other states to adopt
the objective approach through case law include: Iowa, in State v. Mullen, 216 N.W.2d
375 (Iowa 1974); Massachusetts, in Commonwealth v. Harvard, 253 N.E.2d 346 (Mass.
1969); Michigan, in People v. Turner, 210 N.W.2d 336 (Mich. 1973): and Vermont, in
State v. Wilkins, 473 A.2d 295 (Vt. 1983).
An additional 11 states have ratified this approach by statute. They include: Alaska,
ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.450 (1989); Arkansas, ARK. STAT. ANN. § 5-2-209 (Michie 1987);
Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-709 (1986); Hawaii, HAw. REV. STAT. § 702-237
(1985); Illinois, ILL. REV. STAT. 720 ILCS 5/7-12 (1992); Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-
3210 (1988); New York, N.Y. PENAL LAw § 40.05 (McKinney 1987); North Dakota, N.D.
CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-11 (1985); Pennsylvania, 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 313 (1983);
Texas, TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 8.06 (West 1974); and Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-
303 (1990).
66 MODEL PENAL CODE, § 2.13(i) (1985).




persistent offers to overcome hesitancy." 69
The rationale for the objective view rests on the notion that for
public policy reasons, the courts should not "bless" otherwise im-
proper governmental activity simply because a defendant was
predisposed.7° Clearly enunciated by the dissent in Russell, Justice
Stewart drew from the concurring opinions of both Sorrells and Sher-
man in stating that "the very basis of the entrapment defense itself
demands adherence to an approach that focuses on the conduct of
the governmental agents rather than on whether the defendant was
'predisposed' or 'otherwise innocent;' " the fact that a defendant is
induced by government officials rather than private individuals
"does not make him any more innocent or any less predisposed. ' 7 1
Because the only difference in the two situations is the identity of
the tempter, the focus should be on the conduct of government ac-
tors. Thus, entrapment cannot protect the otherwise innocent; it
must control unlawful government officials. To do otherwise would
violate public policy by condoning improprieties.
While the federal courts have specifically rejected the objective
approach in favor of the subjective view of entrapment, there have
been numerous attempts to embrace some of the elements of the
former through the examination of "outrageous conduct" on the
part of law enforcement officials. This has been particularly true in
cases involving reverse stings and has been accomplished under the
guise of "due process" claims.
In response to this concern over outrageous government con-
duct, the Supreme Court has developed a two-step analysis of en-
trapment defenses. 72 First, the court utilizes the subjective approach
to determine if the defendant was predisposed to engage in the
criminal conduct. If predisposition is found, then entrapment fails,
but the defendant still may pursue a due process claim. Under this
second step, government conduct can be reviewed to determine if it
69 LAFAVE & ScoTr, supra note 22, § 5.2(c).
70 An argument could be made that under the subjective approach, a "governmental
impropriety" threshold must be crossed before predisposition becomes a factor. This
notion is supported by the results in Sorrells and Sherman: In both cases either the subjec-
tive view, adopted by the majority, or the objective approach, embraced by the concur-
ring minority, could have been applied and the outcome would have been the same.
However, the approach used would have had a divergent impact in Russell and Hampton
where the minority/objective view differed sharply from the majority/subjective opinion
as to what constitutes improper governmental behavior.
71 United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 441-42 (1973).
72 This line of cases includes: Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932); Sher-
man v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958); Russell, 411 U.S. 423; Hampton v. United
States, 425 U.S. 484 (1976); and Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58 (1988). See supra
notes 36-62 and accompanying text for a discussion of these cases.
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constituted some notion of "outrageousness" as referenced, but not
defined, in Hampton.73
When defendants in federal cases have attempted to shift the
emphasis to an examination of "outrageous conduct" on the part of
government officials, the primary goal has been to demonstrate that
government conduct was sufficiently intolerable to establish a Fifth
Amendment due process violation.74 Here, the circuit courts have
viewed "outrageousness" narrowly, allowing government agents ex-
tensive latitude in their activities. Most of the decisions have fol-
lowed the lead of Hampton v. United States, in which a divided
Supreme Court recognized the notion that government activities
could be sufficiently outrageous to constitute a due process viola-
tion.75 Federal courts, however, have been reluctant to find such a
due process violation.
Owen v. Wainwright 76 exemplifies this reluctance. Owen involved
a typical reverse-sting operation, in which a confidential informant
circulated information that certain individuals (government agents)
were interested in purchasing large quantities of narcotics. The in-
formant sought out potential sellers and arranged a meeting with
the agents. A deal was consummated, and the agents then arrested
the suspects. The Owen court found that "the government participa-
tion alleged here falls far short of the extremely outrageous and
shocking conduct necessary to establish a due process violation." 77
This decision was made despite evidence that the informant was
working on a contingency basis, where payment was based on a per-
centage of the transaction. 78 Similar findings were made in other
73 See Hampton, 425 U.S. at 489.
74 It is argued that incredulous governmental behavior might be shocking to the con-
science, as it was in Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), thereby violating some
notion of substantive due process. Numerous attempts have been made at the federal
level to invoke the concept of "outrageous" governmental behavior. See infra notes 76-
81 and accompanying text. However, as will be seen, these attacks have met with very
little success.
75 Hampton, 425 U.S. at 489.
76 806 F.2d 1519 (11th Cir. 1986).
77 Id. at 1522.
78 The court also specifically stated that the following did not constitute a due pro-
cess violation:
The appellants assert that the informant obtained their participation in the illegal
activity through persistent lucrative offers, despite their initial refusals to become
involved, in order to collect a contingency fee from the Sheriffs Department based
on a percentage of the funds confiscated in the operation. The informant continued
to provide assistance to the appellants in the preparation of the deal. Under the
totality of the circumstances, the appellants claim that the informant's initiation and
furtherance of the drug buy coupled with his contingent fee established an imper-





Case law clearly shows that the federal courts are hesitant to
find due process violations in reverse-sting operations.8 0 This may
be due in part to an inclination to provide considerable latitude to
government officials when predisposition has been established. In
United States v. Quinn, the Eighth Circuit held that once it had been
recognized that a defendant was predisposed to "commit an offense,
we think that it may safely be said that investigative officers and
agents may go a long way in concert with the individual in question
without being deemed to have acted so outrageously as to violate
due process or evoke the exercise by the courts of their supervisory
powers so as to deny to the officers the fruits of their misconduct.""'
Despite their tendency to give enforcement officials great lati-
tude in these types of operations, there are two areas where the
courts seem troubled with government conduct and have at times
found due process violations. The first of these areas concerns situ-
ations in which the government acts as both seller and buyer, and
the defendant serves as a go-between. The Third Circuit addressed
this type of case, sometimes known as a circular sting, in United States
v. West.82 In West, the defendant was brought into a drug deal by a
confidential informant, who supplied him with heroin with the full
knowledge and approval of an undercover agent. The suspect sub-
sequently sold the narcotics to the undercover agent, who then ar-
rested him. The circuit court reversed two of the three distribution
counts against West based on the government's intolerable conduct.
Id.
79 See, e.g., United States v. Sayers, 698 F.2d 1128 (11th Cir. 1983) (no outrageous
conduct when, at the suggestion of DEA agents, convicted-awaiting-sentencing drug
dealer acted as a confidential informant and enticed defendants to put up property in a
marijuana deal); United States v. Walther, 867 F.2d 1334, 1345 (11th Cir. 1989) (no
violation of due process where government agents were involved in "initiating the nego-
tiations, providing the location for the transaction, providing the transportation for the
narcotics, and supplying the narcotics," since conduct was not so outrageous and uncon-
scionable that it violated due process); United States v. Nixon, 777 F.2d 958 (5th Cir.
1985) (reverse-sting operation not outrageous even though the undercover agent threw
a violent temper tantrum which allegedly scared defendants into carrying out the
planned purchase of marijuana with cash and warranty deeds to property).
80 See supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text; see infra note 160. See also United
States v. McCaghren, 666 F.2d 1227 (8th Cir. 1981); United States v. Alexandro, 675
F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1982); United States v. Savage, 701 F.2d 867 (1 lth Cir. 1983); United
States v. Mitchell, 915 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1990). Exceptions to this general rule, how-
ever, often surface when police use circular stings or paid confidential informants. See
infra notes 82-90 and accompanying text.
81 United States v. Quinn, 543 F.2d 640, 648 (8th Cir. 1976). The circuit reaffirmed
this in the reverse-sting case of McCaghren, 666 F.2d 1227, in which DEA agents, once
contacted by a confidential informant, became integrally involved in the transaction.
82 511 F.2d 1083 (3d Cir. 1975).
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In United States v. Bueno,83 the Fifth Circuit previously had made sim-
ilar findings 84 when it reversed a conviction that resulted from a cir-
cular sting, finding entrapment as a matter of law.
The second area involves contingency fee-based confidential in-
formants. 85 The circuits are somewhat split on this issue; early cases
lean against the use of contingency fees, 86 but later cases approve of
this practice. For example, the Fifth Circuit ratified a fee-based ar-
rangement, where a confidential informant agreed to cooperate for
a set fee in United States v. Gentry.87 The Fourth Circuit held similarly
in United States v. Chavis.88 Neither of these cases, however, involved
a fee based on a percentage of the gross recovery of narcotics or
money. 89
While neither of these areas represents an absolute trend in the
federal courts, both illustrate the types of problems that often ac-
company reverse-sting operations. In the case of circular stings, the
courts have tended to give law officers great latitude in constructing
undercover operations designed to deal with major crime problems
83 447 F.2d 903 (5th Cir. 1971). See supra note 61 and accompanying text. See also
United States v. Mosley, 496 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1974), in which the court reversed a
conviction based on the absence of an entrapment instruction. In Mosley, the defendant
claimed that he was given narcotics by an informer, who was an addict herself; the de-
fendant, in turn, sold the narcotics to a federal agent, posing as the informant's
boyfriend.
84 The issue was also addressed earlier in the Ninth Circuit in an illegal liquor case,
Greene v. United States, 454 F.2d 783 (9th Cir. 1972). In this case the defendants had
been targeted by revenue agents, and their "moonshine" business had been halted.
However, the undercover agent in the case recontacted the defendants and convinced
them to reopen the still. When they showed reluctance, the agent offered to supply the
equipment needed, a person to run the still, and in fact did provide a large quantity of
sugar. The court found this to be impermissible involvement on the part of the govern-
ment and a violation of due process.
It should be noted, however, that simply supplying necessary ingredients is insuffi-
ciently outrageous under Russell. Russell v. United States, 41 U.S. 423 (1983). The
Ninth Circuit went even further in this regard in when it affirmed a conviction in United
States v. Wylie, 625 F.2d 1371 (9th Cir. 1980). In this case, agents supplied a main
ingredient of LSD (ergotamine tartrate) in exchange for the final product.
85 For an exhaustive review of this area, see Milton Hirsch, Confidential Informants:
When Crime Pays, 39 U. MIAMI L. REV. 131 (1984).
86 See Williamson v. United States, 311 F.2d 441 (1962) (contingency-fee arrange-
ment rejected because it might lead to "frame-ups").
87 839 F.2d 1065 (5th Cir. 1988) (government payment of a $5000 fee for services to
a reforming cocaine abuser was not "overreaching").
88 880 F.2d 788 (4th Cir. 1989) (a $6000 fee paid to an informant for his assistance in
a reverse-sting case held permissible).
89 It should be noted that in Owen v. Wainwright, 803 F.2d 1519 (11th Cir. 1986), the
court ruled that a reverse-sting operation was not a violation of due process despite the
fact that the confidential informant was working on a contingency fee basis which pro-
vided him with a percentage of the transaction. See also supra notes 76-79 and accompa-
nying text.
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like narcotics sales. As such, elaborate schemes have been designed
to target drug dealers, which can result in agents (or their represent-
atives) acting as both buyer and supplier. When a defendant caught
in a circular sting raises an entrapment defense, it is easily defeated
by a prosecutorial showing of predisposition. 90 A prior proclivity to
engage in the activity also tends to increase judicial tolerance of
what otherwise might be considered unconstitutional "outrageous"
conduct. As a result, both public policy arguments that lie at the
base of the subjective view of entrapment are violated: government
officials are allowed to engage in improper and illegal behavior, and
the crime that occurs is the result of government manufacturing.
In the area of contingency fee-based confidential informant in-
volvement, these and other dangers are apparent as well. Suspect
targeting, the initial contact, and the consummation of the actual
transaction can be influenced or controlled by confidential infor-
mants. Acting as an extension of government, the confidential in-
formant should be held to the same standards of propriety as
agents. As an independent contractor,91 however, the confidential
informant can often operate in an rather autonomous fashion.
When this independence is coupled with a fee contingent on arrest,
particularly if the fee is based on a sliding scale dependent upon a
percentage of a specific sale, problems of improper behavior and
the manufacturing of crime are readily apparent. Contingency fee
arrangements also smack of the due process concerns expressed in
Tumey v. Ohio92 and the inherent problems that surface when a par-
ticipant in the enforcement chain has a direct, pecuniary interest in
the outcome.
3. Application Inconsistencies Between the Two Approaches
To summarize, the subjective approach postulates that entrap-
ment occurs when the otherwise innocent are enticed into criminal
conduct. This type of activity should not be tolerated because it re-
90 As illustrated in West and Bueno, discussed supra notes 82-84 and accompanying
text, courts have found this type of conduct on the part of the police offensive and have
vacated decisions based on due process violations. However, these actions have been
taken only after a determination had been made that the defendant had not been en-
trapped because predisposition had been found. See, e.g., United States v. Bogart, 783
F.2d 1428 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Luttrell, 889 F.2d 806 (9th Cir. 1989).
91 An independent contractor normally is involved in autonomous work not subject
to the supervision of an employer and responsible only for an end product. People v.
Orange County Rd. Constr. Co., 67 N.E. 129 (N.Y. 1903).
92 273 U.S. 510 (1927). In this case, the Court ruled that a Mayor/Judge could not
adjudicate cases when his salary was based in part on the fines he assessed. A similar
conflict of interest argument could be made about confidential informants who stand to
gain personally from a conviction.
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suits in the conviction of persons not targeted by the legislation.
Likewise, this behavior violates the notion of justice, which posits
that it is not the job of government to make criminals out of non-
criminals. The objective approach defines entrapment in terms of
improper government activity alone and suggests that this type of
misbehavior should be rejected for the policy reason that the court
simply must not "consummate an abhorrent transaction." 93
While both approaches overlap somewhat, in that either could
cover certain circumstances, 94 quite different outcomes could result
in other situations. This is due largely to the nature of each ap-
proach and the views of each concerning the two key factors: predis-
position and governmental impropriety. Each presents a dichotomy
of sorts. The defendant was either predisposed or was not predis-
posed. Activities on the part of governmental agents were either
proper or improper. This produces four possible scenarios, as illus-
trated by the following matrix:
CURRENT STATUS OF ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE








93 Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 459 (1932) (Roberts, J., concurring).
94 See supra note 7 1.
95 In this dichotomy, the issue is whether the defendant was predisposed to commit
the crime in question prior to engaging in the prohibited conduct. The answer is either
"predisposition present," meaning that the accused was predisposed to commit the
crime, or "no predisposition found," indicating that defendant had no prior proclivity to
engage in the criminal conduct.
96 In the area of inducement, the conduct of the government is the target of inquiry.
Type I Type 2
Objective: No Entrapment Objective: No Entrapment
Subjective: No Entrapment Subjective: Entrapment
Type 3 Type 4
Objective: Entrapment Objective: Entrapment
Subjective: No Entrapment Subjective: Entrapment
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"No Entrapment" (Type 1) scenarios present few problems. In
this category, legitimate government activity induces or encourages
a defendant who is predisposed to commit the crime in question.
Regardless of the test used, subjective or objective, the defense of
entrapment will be rejected. The opposite, and equally consistent,
outcome results in "Entrapment" (Type 4) situations. When a non-
predisposed defendant is improperly induced by government
agents, both approaches would agree that entrapment has occurred
and the defense would succeed. However, the other two scenarios
(Type 2 and Type 3) provoke debate, as the results will differ de-
pending on the approach taken.
In "No Predisposition/Proper Government Conduct" (Type 2)
scenarios, the accused lacks predisposition, but the conduct of gov-
ernment officials is not considered inappropriate. A defendant
would be convicted under the objective approach because the in-
ducement used by government officials was proper. However, an
entrapment defense would succeed under the subjective view if the
jury was convinced that the defendant was not predisposed to com-
mit the offense. On the other extreme, "Predisposition/Improper
Government Conduct" (Type 3) scenarios, predisposition is present
but government conduct is improper. Under these circumstances, a
defendant could escape conviction if objective criteria were applied
because the inducements utilized were improper. Yet, under the
subjective approach, the entrapment defense would fail due to the
defendant's predisposition.
Both of these categories present conflicting results and their
own individual problems. "No Predisposition/Proper Government
Conduct" (Type 2) situations violate the concern over the manufac-
turing of crime, in that non-predisposed individuals are encapsu-
lated into the justice system due only to governmental inducements.
Absent the government's encouragement, these otherwise innocent
persons would not be facing criminal charges. This official manu-
facture of crime is objectionable for several reasons. First, scarce
resources dictate that agents of the criminal justice system should
not create additional crime or criminals. 97 Overcrowded jails, dock-
ets, and prisons evidence the inability of the system to accommodate
The major question is whether the officers' actions were within the bounds of acceptable
behavior. While the outer limits of propriety are relatively easy to establish,
distinguishing between what is proper and improper can be quite difficult. An example
of a "proper" enticement might include an offer by an agent to buy contraband from a
suspected drug dealer. An "improper" inducement might consist of a threat by an
undercover officer to injure a suspect's spouse unless the individual assisted in a drug
transaction.
97 Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 396, 372 (1958).
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the offenders who come into contact with the courts on their own.98
Second, the justice system is based on the concept of retroactivity.
Criminal responsibility attaches at the point of commission, and the
system is designed to react to criminal events. The system should
not be in the business of encouraging criminal behavior by channel-
ing would-be criminals into positions that they have not voluntarily
placed themselves. Third, major principles upon which the justice
system is based, such as the presumption of innocence, equal pro-
tection, and due process of law, are threatened if the manufacture of
crime goes unchecked. 99 Finally, the role of government is to re-
duce crime, not contribute to it. This concept is reflected in penal
codes and in the general discretionary policies promulgated by vari-
ous components of the criminal justice system. 100
While "No Predisposition/Proper Government Conduct"
(Type 2) scenarios unnecessarily broaden the influence of the jus-
tice system, "Predisposition/Improper Government Conduct"
(Type 3) circumstances do the opposite. Individuals who are willing
to engage in crime are allowed to escape prosecution because the
government acted improperly in securing their involvement. Of
course, this improper persuasion was, by definition, unnecessary, as
the defendant was already inclined to engage in the illegal behavior
and almost any (proper) inducement would have sufficed. The re-
sults of "Predisposition/Improper Government Conduct" (Type 3)
situations, while adhering to the public policy of intolerance toward
improper government acts, circumvents the crime-control role of
the justice system.
Such a result may be preferable, on the ground that "it is a
less[er] evil that some criminals should escape than that the govern-
ment should play an ignoble part."10 1 An equally strong position
demands that otherwise innocent persons not be convicted simply
because officials duped them. Under the current subjective-objec-
tive dichotomy, however, it is impossible for both approaches to
produce the same results. As a result, defendants who are en-
couraged by government agents to engage in criminal conduct will
either be acquitted (via a successful entrapment defense) or con-
victed based solely on the type of entrapment approach taken.
This article advocates the adoption of a single entrapment stan-
dard, which utilizes both the subjective and objective criteria. A sin-
98 See generally GEORGE COLE, THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 168 (6th
ed. 1992).
99 LAFAVE & SCOTr, supra note 22, § 5.2.
100 SeeJoEL SAMAHA, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 25-31 (2d ed. 1991).
101 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 470 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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gle standard would serve several purposes. First, such an approach
would provide predictability and a well-grounded rationale for the
defense. Entrapment would depend on a specific standard and not
isolate solely on one's "objective" or "subjective" leanings. Sec-
ond, a solitary approach would be easier to manage and monitor.
Finally, adopting a single standard, which combines both the objec-
tive and subjective views of entrapment, will address problems of
fairness and propriety. Government officials and defendants would
have clear guidelines as to boundaries of acceptable government be-
havior. Such a strategy could provide the flexibility needed in un-
dercover operations, while at the same time adhering to the public
policy demands that are at the root of the entrapment defense. The
solution proffered here would combine the two approaches by pro-
viding a balance between the extent of improper government con-
duct and the level of the defendant's predisposition to engage in the
criminal conduct. The need for such a move is clearly illustrated in
the case of Keith Jacobson.
III. THE CASE FOR REFORMATION: JACOBSON V. UNITED STATES
In 1992, the United States Supreme Court confronted the issue
of entrapment and the reverse sting in the case of Keith Jacobson.
Unlike many previous entrapment cases which had involved the dis-
tribution of narcotics, Jacobson v. United States 10 2 involved child por-
nography. In response to what is considered an international
problem, Congress passed a series of tough laws to deal with the
sexual exploitation of children.' 0 3 The various statutes provided
federal enforcement officials with broad latitude to target producers
and purchasers of child pornography. Included in the arsenal were
various enforcement techniques, including reverse stings.'0 4
Two agencies organized elaborate reverse stings to apprehend
102 Jacobson v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1535 (1992).
103 These include: Pub. L. No. 95-225; Pub. L. No. 98-292; Pub. L. No. 99-500; Pub.
L. No. 99-628; and Pub. L. No. 100-690. For a global review of the problem of child
pornography, see Note, Can We End the Shame-Recent Multilateral Efforts to Address the
World Pornography Market, 23 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 435 (1990).
104 See Brief of Amici Curiae of National Center for Missing and Exploited Children,
et al., which argued that:
[r]everse sting investigations in federal child pornography cases have provided the
most effective method to detect and stop the purchase and use of child pornogra-
phy. Hundreds of individuals, most undoubtedly pedophiles or child molesters,
who have been convicted over the past five years, would not have been detected nor
caught with traditional investigative methods. The secretive underground network,
which distributes and buys child pornography, is a continuing threat to children and
can and must be pierced by 'reverse stings' to prevent further sexual abuse of chil-




child pornographers: the U.S. Customs Service set up "Operation
Borderline," and the U.S. Postal Service operated several stings, the
most notable of which was "Project Looking Glass." These opera-
tions primarily targeted producers and potential buyers, and in-
volved fronts of child pornography businesses in Hong Kong and
the Virgin Islands. 105 Typically, potential suspects were earmarked
when they responded to ads placed in certain sexually exploitive
magazines, when federal agents replied to ads which potential sus-
pects placed in these magazines, or when agencies uncovered names
from mailing lists or other records confiscated from previous ar-
rests.106 Once identified, targets were sent an unsolicited question-
naire, which requested information concerning sexuality. If the
suspect responded and gave certain answers, then a catalog of avail-
able child pornography material was sent to the individual. If an
order was placed, it was filled using a "controlled delivery,"' 1 7 and
enforcement officials obtained a search warrant. Officials then
would conduct a search and arrest suspects, typically in possession
of the "sting" material.' 08
In a series of cases commencing in the mid-1980s, 10 9 various
circuits found that the reverse stings utilized in these operations
were permissible. Defendants often asserted entrapment but con-
sistently lost on this ground because predisposition was found. 110
By their very nature, such operations require at least some predis-
position on the part of suspects.' 11 As such, traditional entrapment
arguments were largely ineffective.
105 United States v. Goodwin, 854 F.2d 33, 35 (4th Cir. 1988).
106 See United States v. Esch, 832 F.2d 531, 539 (10th Cir. 1987).
107 A controlled delivery involves the dispatch or transfer, via the U.S. Mail or a com-
mercial service, of a package under the control and supervision of government agents.
See United States v. Rubio, 834 F.2d 442, 446 (5th Cir. 1987).
108 For a description of these arrests, see United States v. Mitchell, 915 F.2d 521 (9th
Cir. 1990), and United States v. Wegman, 917 F.2d 1307 (9th Cir. 1990) [unpublished
disposition available on WESTLAW].
109 See, e.g., United States v. Gantzer, 810 F.2d 349 (2d Cir. 1987); United States v.
Johnson, 855 F.2d 299 (6th Cir. 1988); United States v. Moore, 916 F.2d 1131 (6th Cir.
1990); Rubio, 834 F.2d 442 (5th Cir. 1987); and United States v. Thoma, 726 F.2d 1191
(7th Cir. 1984).
110 See, e.g., Rubio, 834 F.2d at 450; Thoma, 726 F.2d at 1196-97.
111 Once suspects responded to an initial mailing, agency representatives used a vari-
ety of ploys to solicit further participation. In "Project Looking Glass," the follow-up
contact was often made through a letter, which included the following language: "We
have read the comments of Mr. Van Rabb of your Customs Service concerning the ef-
forts of his agents to find 'children's pornography' and we find that many of you are
denied a product because of that agency.... For those of you who have enjoyed youth-
ful material from [certain publishers], we have devised a method of getting these to you




The U.S. Supreme Court directly confronted these issues in
Jacobson v. United States.' 12 In this reverse-sting case, the defendant
was convicted of receiving child pornography through the mails in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2).113 While the Court ruled that,
as a matter of law, Jacobson was entrapped because the government
failed to prove he was predisposed to commit the crime, the Court
provided few guidelines as to the minimum requirements of
predisposition.
Although the facts appear to be fairly straightforward, consider-
able disagreement arose in the case over the government's initial
targeting of the defendant. In February 1984, KeithJacobson, a Ne-
braska farmer, ordered two magazines and a brochure from a Cali-
fornia firm, the Electric Moon. The magazines, Bare Boys I and Bare
Boys II, were billed as nudist publications, but their possession was
not a violation of either state or federal law at the time of receipt. 1 14
In May 1984, government agents searched the Electric Moon busi-
ness premises and seized a mailing list that contained Jacobson's
name. Eight months later, a postal inspector, posing as the fictitious
"American Hedonist Society," sentJacobson a solicitation letter, an
application for membership, and a survey on sexual attitudes. 1 5
Jacobson completed the application and also returned a survey,
where he noted that he "enjoyed material on pre-teen sex." ' 16 Over
the next two-plus years, postal authorities repeatedly contacted
Jacobson under an array of guises, including an appeal to First
Amendment values. 117 Eventually, in March 1987, Jacobson or-
dered an illegal magazine from a postal-front operation supposedly
based in Hong Kong. 18 Postal authorities, through a controlled de-
112 112 S. Ct. 1535 (1992).
113 This code section refers to a provision of the Child Protection Act of 1984, Pub. L.
98-292, which forbids the mailing of material depicting children engaged in explicit sex-
ual conduct. 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2)(A) (1992).
114 See United States v. Jacobson, 916 F.2d 467, 472 (8th Cir. 1990).
115 This activity on the part of the U.S. Postal Service was part of "Project Looking
Glass;" which paralleled a similar effort on the part of the Customs Service, known as
"Operation Borderline," discussed supra at note 111.
116 Brief for the United States at 5, Jacobson v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1535
(1992)(90-1124).
117 At one point, a postal front organization suggested thatJacobson purchase mate-
rial as part of a fight against censorship. "Heartland Institute for a New Tomorrow
(HINT) described itself as 'an organization founded to protect and promote sexual free-
dom and freedom of choice' and stated that 'the most appropriate means to accomplish
[its] objectives is to promote honest dialogue among concerned individuals and to con-
tinue its lobbying efforts with State Legislators.' "Jacobson, 112 S. Ct. 1535, 1546 (1992)
(quoting from Record, Defendant's Exhibit 113). The Court went on to say that "these
lobbying efforts were to be financed through catalogue sales." Id.
118 In March 1987, the U.S. Customs Service joined the investigation and mailed
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livery, mailedJacobson the publication, Boys Who Love Boys, that con-
tained photographs which clearly violated the law. 1 9 On June 16,
1987, law enforcement officers arrested Jacobson and searched his
home, finding only the materials originally purchased from Electric
Moon and the magazine ordered during the sting operation. Jacob-
son's entrapment defense at trial failed, and he was convicted. An
Eighth Circuit panel initially reveresed this conviction, 120 but the
appellate court reinstated after an en banc hearing.12'
The primary issue litigated at the appellate level was whether
the government must have some minimum level of suspicion before
it can launch an investigation. The panel overturned the conviction
because before targeting Jacobson, the government had no evi-
dence giving rise to a reasonable suspicion that Jacobson had com-
mitted a similar crime in the past or was likely to commit such a
crime in the future.122 The full circuit, however, affirmed the origi-
nal conviction, concentrating on the government's conduct: "In our
view, when the government's investigatory conduct does not offend
due process, the mere fact the undercover investigation is started
without reasonable suspicion 'does not bar the conviction of those
who rise to its bait.' " 123
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari on only one issue-
whether the defendant was entrapped as a matter of law.124 Jacob-
Jacobson a brochure patterned after genuine child pornography solicitations. He re-
sponded by placing an order for material that would have been illegal to possess under
federal child pornography laws. The reason for non-delivery was not disclosed at trial.
See Brief for the United States, supra note 116, at 4.
119 The specific code section of the Child Protection Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-292,
forbids the transfer via the mails of a "visual depiction [that] involves the use of a minor
engaging in sexually explicit conduct." 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2)(A) (1992).
120 United States v. Jacobson, 893 F.2d 999 (8th Cir. 1990).
121 United States v.Jacobson, 916 F.2d 467, 472 (8th Cir. 1990) (en banc).
122 Id. at 468 (1990).
123 Id. at 474 (quoting United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578, 609 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 457 U.S. 1106 (1982)).
124 According to U.S. Law Week, Jacobson originally submitted seven questions for
review, ranging in subject matter from evidence of predisposition to the existence of a
defense of "outrageous government conduct" in federal cases, 59 U.S.L.W. 3640
(1990). The Court, however, only accepted the third question for certiorari (59 U.S.L.W.
at 3723):
(3) When government has attempted and failed in three separate undercover opera-
tions covering two years of testing and soliciting to persuade defendant to receive
child pornography through mails and defendant does not qualify either under attor-
ney general's guidelines for conduct of undercover operations or guidelines estab-
lished by postal inspectors for inclusion in undercover operation in which
defendant is finally ensnared, has defendant been entrapped as matter of law?
59 U.S.L.W. at 3640.
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son continued to argue1 25 that the government did not have reason-
able suspicion in order to begin an investigation. According to
Jacobson, the fact that he had ordered and received a publication
that was legal at the time demonstrated that the government did not
have reasonable suspicion.1 26 The government contended that a
reasonable suspicion is not required but, even if it was, Jacobson's
ordering of material in the past provided sufficient foundation for
the initial inquiry which was made in January 1985.127 Interestingly,
neither side directly addressed the issue of predisposition in their
briefs to the Court. 128
In a 5-4 decision, the Court reversed the conviction "[b]ecause
the Government overstepped the line between setting a trap for the
'unwary innocent' and the 'unwary criminal,'.., and as a matter of
law failed to establish that petitioner was independently predis-
posed to commit the crime for which he was arrested."' 129 Justice
White, writing for the majority, ruled that when the government in-
duces a defendant to commit a crime, a fact not disputed in this
case, the prosecution must prove that the defendant was predis-
posed. The Court held that while government officials were permit-
ted to induce defendants by merely offering an opportunity to
purchase illegal material, they did more in this instance. "By the
time petitioner finally placed his order, he had already been the tar-
get of twenty-six months of repeated mailings and communications
from Government agents and fictitious organizations."'' 3 0 The
Court also seemed troubled by two additional factors: (1) the fact
that initial attention was drawn to Jacobson by his ordering of Bare
Boys I & II, an act that was legal at the time; and (2) the constitu-
125 Technically, the Court did not grant certiorari on this issue, as evidenced byjus-
tice O'Connor's exchange with Jacobson's attorney at oral argument:
Justice O'Connor: Do you take the position that the government must always prove
predisposition by pointing to events that occurred before the sting?
Moyer: Yes.
O'Connor: Isn't that the same as requiring reasonable suspicion beforehand that
the target was inclined to commit the crime?
Moyer: Yes.
O'Connor: But we didn't grant cert on that question.
60 U.S.L.W. 3393 (1990). Nevertheless, the idea that the government had insufficient
cause to initiate the investigation continues to be a central point throughout the case.
126 At the timeJacobson bought the material, it was legal to do so according to both
federal and Nebraska law. Jacobson v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1535, 1541 (1992).
127 Brief for the United States, supra note 116 at 1553.
128 See Brief for the Petitioner, Jacobson v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1535 (1992) (90-
1124).
129 Jacobson, 112 S. Ct. at 1540 (citations omitted).
130 Id. at 1552.
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tional problems inherent in pressuring Jacobson to obtain material
in order to fight censorship.
The crux of the decision, however, was predisposition, or rather
"pre-predisposition." The majority held that "the prosecution must
prove beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant was disposed to
commit the criminal act prior to first being approached by Govern-
ment agents."'' l In other words, proof must be offered that the
defendant was predisposed to commit the crime before being ap-
proached by enforcement officers. In this case, the Court rejected
the government's argument that predisposition could be proved by
Jacobson's participation in the exchange of correspondence.13 2
However, the Court offered no advice as to precisely what consti-
tutes prior predisposition, other than to hint that participation in a
legal transaction (which was subsequently made illegal) was
insufficient.13 3
The current state of the law on entrapment underJacobson ap-
pears to hinge on predisposition. Initially, in order to rely on the
defense, the accused must show that the government instigated the
defendant's involvement in the offense. Once it is established that
behavior on the part of officials spawned the offense, the burden of
proof shifts to the prosecution to prove predisposition by the de-
fendant. This proclivity must reach back to a point prior to govern-
ment targeting of the suspect. While there are no guidelines as to
what constitutes prior predisposition, it seems clear that without
some evidence of an antecedent propensity to commit the crime, the
trial court should find entrapment as a matter of law. With some
evidence of prior predisposition, the matter is forwarded to the jury
for a determination of the sufficiency of the defendant's proclivity to
commit the crime. Should the jury find predisposition, the entrap-
ment defense fails. Only if the court finds that the government's
behavior is sufficiently reprehensible to constitute a due process vio-
lation will the defendant prevail.
The case of Keith Jacobson represents the inherent problems
with this approach, and two scenarios illustrate the dilemma in-
volved. 134 What if there had been some evidence of prior predispo-
sition? Suppose that when federal authorities searched Jacobson's
131 Id. at 1550 (emphasis added).
132 The minority argued that predisposition was demonstrated because both times
that he was offered the opportunity to purchase material, Jacobson responded with an
order. Id. at 1559.
133 Id. at 1542 n.3.




home, they had discovered a catalog offering illicit material, which
the defendant had procured from an independent source prior to the
investigation. A court could easily interpret this as prior proclivity
and thus Jacobson's case would go to the jury and likely result in a
conviction (as it actually did). In this first scenario, the defendant's
conviction turns on a minor piece of evidence that does little to alter
the government's behavior or the defendant's response to that con-
duct. There is only the slightest piece of evidence that the defend-
ant had any prior leanings toward the crime in question. However,
when the guidelines set forth inJacobson are applied, the defendant
under this set of circumstances is not entrapped as a matter of law,
despite the fact that there is no evidence that he would have en-
gaged in this type of activity had it not been for the persistence of
federal agents.
On the other hand, what if Jacobson's post-contact behavior
had demonstrated a voracious appetite for illicit child pornography?
Suppose that once contacted, Jacobson began soliciting the partici-
pation of undercover agents and others in establishing a new under-
ground network of child pornographers or had contracted to
produce illegal photographs. According to the majority inJacobson,
the defendant could successfully argue that he was entrapped as a
matter of law because there was no evidence of prior predisposition.
In this second example, a much more reprehensible defendant is
able to escape prosecution simply because no evidence can be pro-
duced that indicates a prior proclivity. The second variation of the
facts also violates the purposes of the entrapment defense, which is
to discourage improper government behavior and prevent the en-
capsulation of otherwise law-abiding individuals. In the second sce-
nario, the defendant may avoid conviction simply because of a
technicality: while ample evidence exists that the defendant was not
motivated solely by government prompting, he is nonetheless al-
lowed to go free because agents were unable to produce evidence of
prior predisposition.
Neither outcome seems fair nor judicially defensible, and
neither can be squared with the purposes and public policy concerns
that are at the heart of the entrapment defense. In the first scenario,
an arguably "otherwise innocent" person faces an uphill entrap-
ment battle simply because there is meager evidence of prior pro-
clivity. This outcome clearly violates the idea that the government
should not manufacture crime. The other variation of the facts goes
too far in the other direction. It allows an "undoubtedly predis-
posed" defendant to escape conviction not because of improper
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conduct but due to the prosecution's failure to prove prior
predisposition.
The dilemma posed in these two examples is potentially pres-
ent in numerous reverse-sting operations. Like the case of the full-
circle drug bust, the facts represented in the above scenarios en-
compass two fluid concepts: the predisposition of the defendant and
the government's behavior in encouraging criminal behavior.
These two concepts interact and thus should not be viewed as
"either/or" notions.
IV. POTENTIAL SOLUTION
In an effort to solve the problems raised by the reverse sting as
illustrated by Jacobson, this article proposes a standard of entrap-
ment that blends the two concepts of defendant predisposition and
government misconduct. The article will first lay out the proposi-
tions of the recommended standard; then it will show why this pro-
posal is more effective than other potential solutions.
Essentially, this standard balances government impropriety
against offender predisposition. First, the proposal requires a dem-
onstration of governmental impropriety. This matter, to be decided
by the court, would embody a low threshold question of whether an
ordinary person might be swayed by the government's conduct.
The defendant would raise the issue and carry the burden of prov-
ing that the police operation entailed some inappropriate govern-
mental behavior. If the court found that no impropriety existed,
then it could conclude that officials merely offered the defendant an
opportunity to commit the crime.
However, if the court found that the conduct of government
officials entailed more than simply offering the defendant the op-
portunity to engage in criminal conduct, entrapment could be raised
as a defense. The burden then would shift to the prosecution to
prove the predisposition of the defendant. The defendant would be
entitled to counter with evidence to the contrary and argue that,
despite any proof of predisposition, improper conduct on the part
of enforcement officials motivated the defendant's involvement in
the criminal enterprise. The government obviously could rebut
with proof that the conduct was proper. Finally, the jury would
weigh the level of government misconduct against the degree of
predisposition by the individual defendant. In doing so, it would
determine whether the government's misconduct outweighed the
defendant's predisposition, or whether the proclivity to engage in
the conduct on the part of the accused overcame the government's
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inappropriate behavior. The key question is whether prior disposi-
tion or government conduct was a more important influence on the
defendant's involvement.
The proposed standard, then, involves a three-step process that
encompasses both the objective and the subjective views of entrap-
ment. In the first step, the defendant must convince the court that
some government impropriety exists. The purpose of this initial
threshold is to determine if entrapment is possible as a defense at
all. If there is any evidence that an ordinary person might reason-
ably have been influenced by the government's conduct, then the
court rules that the entrapment defense is available. This initial in-
quiry clearly embodies the objective test because it looks not to the
individual defendant, but rather to the ordinary person to deter-
mine if the government's conduct unduly could have influenced be-
havior. This low threshold recognition, however, is tempered by the
subjective approach. If the court determines that the government's
conduct was not improper, then the defendant, at best, took advan-
tage of an opportunity offered by enforcement officials. This con-
clusion is consistent with the current federal position under the
subjective approach, in which offering a "mere opportunity" to en-
gage in a criminal act does not constitute entrapment.13 5 If the
court finds that something more than the mere offer of an opportu-
nity exists, it then proceeds to the next step.
In the second step, the prosecution must offer proof that the
defendant was predisposed to commit the offense. This stage also
involves a subjective threshold examination, which is essentially the
test currently used in the federal courts. As described in the Sorrells-
Sherman doctrine, 3 6 the court determines whether the defendant
was predisposed to commit the offense in question. If there is no
evidence of predisposition, then the court finds entrapment as a
matter of law.' 3 7 On the other hand, if there is some evidence that a
jury could interpret as predisposition, then the matter is determined
by the jury in step three.
135 See supra note 37. It could be argued, however, that this entire first step in this
proposed standard is duplicative of that outlined in Jacobson. However, it should be
noted that under the current federal approach, the defense must show that the defend-
ant's conduct was induced by government activity; it need not prove that the behavior of
officials was improper. Under this proposed model, it is incumbent upon the defense to
show that the government behaved improperly, if only marginally so.
136 See supra note 36.
137 This, too, represents current law as made clear inJacobson, see supra notes 131-32
and accompanying text. In fact, according to theJacobson Court, the prosecution must
prove prior proclivity or lose to an entrapment defense. Proof of such propensity is not
required under the standard proposed here.
1086 [Vol. 83
ENTRAPMENT STANDARD
In this final step, the jury is charged with weighing the defend-
ant's predisposition against the government's misconduct, since the
court already has determined that both exist. 138 The jury examines
the defendant's predisposition in the context of the level of procliv-
ity to become involved in the offense against a backdrop of im-
proper government conduct. 13 9 The jury then compares the
defendant's predisposition with the government's misbehavior to
determine which factor motivated involvement in the offense. If the
jury determines that the primary motivating factor was the improper
conduct of enforcement officials, then it must find entrapment. If,
on the other hand, it concludes that the defendant's predisposition
outweighed the government's misconduct, then it must determine
that no entrapment occurred.
While this proposed solution presents its own set of
problems, 40 it provides a mechanism that clearly balances the pri-
mary concerns of both the subjective and objective approaches to
entrapment. Returning to the matrix, 4 1 this proporal reconciles
the two troublesome scenarios and results in consistent conclusions.
In "No Predisposition/Proper Government Conduct"' 42 (Type 2)
situations, where an entrapment defense is possible under the sub-
jective approach but not available with the objective view, the con-
cerns of both the defense and the government would be weighed.
In these instances, where defendant predisposition is absent and the
government conduct is deemed proper, problems currently arise
when defendants, who have little or no predisposition to commit a
crime, are duped by a "tricky" yet legally acceptable government
scheme. Under the proposed model, "otherwise innocent" 143 per-
sons who are ensnared in a government scheme could escape con-
viction if their low level of predisposition is outweighed by an
overbearing government scheme. They could not avoid criminal lia-
bility, however, if the overbearing aspects of the government's con-
duct were outweighed by the defendant's clear willingness to
undertake the criminal activity.
138 The court has determined the existence of government misconduct in the first
step, and the potential presence of predisposition in the second.
139 The notion that the defendant's proclivity can be described in varying degrees
assumes that the concept is not static, but flexible in nature. This position is based on
the argument that predisposition is a fluid idea where there are levels of predilection.
This position is buttressed by theJacobson scenarios discussed earlier, see supra note 133
and accompanying text.
140 See infra pp. 1094-95 for a discussion of the drawbacks to this model.
141 See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
142 Id.
143 See supra note 38.
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To illustrate, in the variation of theJacobson case, 144 where the
prosecution presents evidence of prior proclivity, the defendant
would not automatically lose the entrapment argument. Rather, the
proposed procedure would provide a more balanced approach. If
Jacobson wanted to pursue an entrapment defense, he would first
need to convince the court that the postal inspectors' actions were
improper. The appropriate inquiry at this stage would be whether
an ordinary person subjected to such solicitations might be swayed
by them. If the trial court found (as the Supreme Court apparently
did) that the behavior was at least reprehensible, then the defendant
would be allowed to present an entrapment defense, and the focus
would shift to the issue of predisposition. The prosecution then
would carry the burden of proving predisposition and would ac-
cordingly provide evidence of the defendant's prior proclivity.
Jacobson then would have an opportunity to rebut this evidence and
could argue that, despite any prior penchant to engage in the illegal-
ity, the government's outrageous conduct was a stronger motivating
factor for the criminal act than theJacobson's predisposition. After
hearing evidence from both sides, the jury would weigh the govern-
ment conduct against the defendant's predisposition to determine if
Jacobson was entrapped. Rather than relying on the presence or
absence of a scintilla of evidence, the entrapment decision would be
based on a balance of predisposition against improper conduct:
which one contributed most to the defendant's involvement?
With "Predisposition/Improper Government Conduct"1 45
(Type 3) situations, a different set of problems exists. The entrap-
ment defense is available under the objective approach, but not
under the subjective method. Defendants may successfully argue
entrapment only when government misconduct is present, regard-
less of the defendant's predisposition. Under this view, the central
problem is that individuals who are ready, willing, and able to com-
mit a crime-and would thus be swayed by virtually any government
plan-are allowed to escape conviction due to improper law en-
forcement conduct. Under the proposed model, these "undoubt-
edly predisposed"' 146 individuals will find it difficult to elude
prosecution unless the government conduct is so outrageous that it
144 See supra note 134 and accompanying text. Under this variation of the facts, there
is minimal evidence (such as the discovery of a catalog offering illicit material found
during a search of his home) thatJacobson may have had predisposition to engage in the
government operation prior to the initial contact.
145 See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
146 With these individuals, clear evidence exists that they were predisposed to engage
in the criminal conduct at issue.
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overshadows an overt willingness to participate and, in effect, repre-
sents a violation of due process.
This scenario is exemplified when the otherJacobson variation is
examined.1 47 In this modification of the facts, following an initial
contact, the defendant demonstrated an insatiable appetite for child
pornography, even though no evidence of prior predisposition ex-
isted. Under the objective approach, Jacobson's entrapment would
turn, not on his demonstrated willingness to participate in the
scheme after being contacted, but rather on the government's activi-
ties. If these actions were deemed improper, then Jacobson would
be acquitted. On the other hand, if the scheme was considered
proper, then the defendant could not benefit from the defense.
Under current law, however, this second scenario surely would end
in an acquittal. The government could not prove prior proclivity on
the defendant's part; therefore, entrapment would be present as
matter of law.
The proposed model would produce a different result. Rather
than ruling that the defendant was entrapped because the govern-
ment could not prove prior predisposition (as is currently required
inJacobson), the court would first rule on the presence or absence of
improper government conduct. Once established, the prosecution's
inability to prove pre-contact proclivity would not end the matter.
Instead, the jury would be given the opportunity to balance the gov-
ernment's conduct against the absence of the defendant's initial pre-
disposition; the jury would still be able to consider, however, the
presence of post-contact receptiveness. In this second variation, the
defendant would not be released simply because there was no evi-
dence of predisposition. The jury would decide whether the de-
fendant's conduct exemplified that of an otherwise innocent
individual who was duped by the government or a person who
seized the opportunity to purchase illicit material.
The balancing approach offered here would address the
problems which plague both the subjective and objective views of
entrapment. It would allow the jury to balance the defendant's pre-
disposition (including prior proclivity and post-contact behavior) to
engage in crime, against the government's conduct in soliciting in-
volvement. The model maintains the thrust of the current federal
(subjective) approach through its recognition of predisposition.1 48
Unjust outcomes involving this approach, however, would be
147 See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
148 The court, and not ajury, would handle persons who are not predisposed at all. If
there was evidence of improper government conduct yet no proof of predisposition, the
court would rule entrapment as a matter of law. On the other hand, if the court was
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avoided when marginally predisposed defendants who are seduced
by clearly improper government schemes are able to argue to the
jury that their involvement was due more to the enticement than to
their own proclivity. On the other hand, more savvy defendants,
who willingly volunteered to become involved in government opera-
tions, would not be able to circumvent the goals of entrapment, and
thereby escape criminal liability, simply because agents had con-
structed an insidious plan. The model also would be consistent with
the objective approach in that, regardless of a defendant's predispo-
sition, the entrapment defense would be available where the govern-
ment's conduct is deemed reprehensible to the point that an
ordinary person would find it hard to resist.
This approach presents a more equitable balancing test than
the other options, which involve some combination of the subjective
and objective views. Essentially, three basic strategies address the
key elements of defendant predisposition and government impro-
priety. The first approach simply requires proof of both an absence
of predisposition and the presence of impropriety; the second dic-
tates the presence of either; and in the third, the two concepts blend
together.
The first strategy is based on the position that government offi-
cials should be given a relatively free hand in undercover work and
the defense of entrapment should be available only where no evi-
dence of predisposition exists, but there is proof that the defendant
was improperly induced to commit the crime. This approach would
maximize the freedom of enforcement officials to "root out"
criminals, while still preserving a defense where the truly "would
be" innocent could seek relief through an affirmative defense. 149
The strategy here represents the "Entrapment" (Type 4) scena-
rio'5 0 in the matrix and has been adopted in NewJersey. There, the
high court has required that to prove entrapment, the defendant
must satisfy both an objective and subjective test.' 51 First, the de-
convinced that the government had provided only an opportunity to commit the crime,
then entrapment would not be available as a defense.
149 This approach is in line with what Herbert Packer calls the "Crime Control
Model" ofjustice. According to this model, emphasis is placed upon apprehending and
punishing criminals in order to provide for a more crime-free society. Officials in the
justice system are considered to be not only trustworthy but also in need of maximum
flexibility if they are to be successful in bringing crime under control. HERBERT PACKER,
THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 160-61 (1968).
150 See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
151 The New Jersey Supreme Court relied on the state code, which reads:
Entrapment
a. A public law enforcement official or a person engaged in cooperation with
such an official or one acting as an agent of a public law enforcement official perpe-
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fendant must prove that conduct on the part of law enforcement
officials was such that an average person might be induced to com-
mit the offense, thereby meeting the objective prong. Second, the
defendant must meet the subjective prong by showing that the
"conduct in fact caused" the commission of the crime.1 52 In New
Jersey v. Gibbons,'53 the court expanded the subjective causation ele-
ment to include predisposition. Therefore, to prove entrapment in
New Jersey, defendants must first demonstrate that government
conduct would have swayed an average person to engage in the
criminal act; then they must prove that they were not predisposed to
commit the crime, and thus must have been persuaded solely by the
government's inducement.
While this approach is relatively simple, it presents problems
that defeat the purpose of an entrapment defense and the subjective
and objective strategies. Under this scheme, it is possible to convict
persons who are not the target of the legislation at hand, thereby
obviating a primary goal of the subjective approach. Ordinary peo-
ple can be ensnared by overbearing government conduct unless
they can prove that they lacked any personal predisposition. In ad-
dition, the New Jersey plan encapsulates the otherwise innocent,
thus violating the other primary justification for the subjective ap-
proach. According to this strategy, even if defendants lack the req-
uisite predisposition, they risk conviction unless they can prove that
the government's actions would have enticed an ordinary person
into committing the offense. This results in a clear path for law en-
forcement to "manufacture" crime by involving otherwise innocent
persons 54 in conduct in which they would have never engaged but
trates an entrapment if for the purpose of obtaining evidence of the commission of
an offense, he induces or encourages and, as a direct result, causes another person
to engage in conduct constituting such offense by either:
(1) Making knowingly false representations designed to induce the belief that
such conduct is not prohibited; or
(2) Employing methods of persuasion or inducement which create a substan-
tial risk that such an offense will be committed by persons other than those who are
ready to commit it.
b. Except as provided in subsection c. of this section, a person prosecuted for
an offense shall be acquitted if he proves by a preponderance of evidence that his
conduct occurred in response to an entrapment. The issue of entrapment shall be
tried by the trier of fact.
c. The defense afforded by this section is unavailable when causing or threat-
ening bodily injury is an element of the offense charged and the prosecution is
based on conduct causing or threatening such injury to a person other than the
person perpetrating the entrapment.
NJ. REv. STAT. § 2C:2-12 (1990).
152 State v. Rockholt, 476 A.2d 1236, 1238 (NJ. 1984).
153 519 A.2d 350, 361 (NJ. 1987).
154 These individuals hold the status of the "otherwise innocent" because they were
not predisposed to commit the crime.
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for government enticement. On the reverse side, obviously im-
proper government activity can result in a conviction which violates
the foundation for the objective approach: although the court
should not "consummate an abhorrent transaction," 1 55 a conviction
is likely when impropriety is present but so, too, is predisposition.
The second avenue is equally simple but founded on a different
view of freedom for enforcement officials. Here, the entrapment de-
fense would be available unless the defendant was both predisposed
and induced by proper governmental conduct. In all other cases,
the defense would be available when either the defendant was not
predisposed or when government activities were deemed improper.
Under this broad approach, the entrapment defense would be avail-
able in almost all circumstances. This would severely limit enforce-
ment freedom in undercover operations but still would permit
convictions of the obviously guilty, those who were predisposed to
commit the offense and subject to proper government activities.1 56
Under the second approach, defendants may demonstrate entrap-
ment by proving either a lack of predisposition or a presence of gov-
ernment impropriety. 57 New Mexico created this broad either/or
test for entrapment in Baca v. State. 158 In this "circular sting" case,
the Supreme Court of New Mexico expanded the entrapment rule
so that a defendant "may successfully assert the defense of entrap-
ment, either by showing lack of predisposition to commit the crime
for which he is charged, or, that the police exceeded the standards
of proper investigation, as here where the government was both the
supplier and the purchaser of the contraband and defendant was
recruited as a mere conduit."' 1 9 The problems with this approach
are obvious. When the government is required to generate an un-
dercover plan that is totally above-board and then must restrict their
targeting to persons who are identifiable as "predisposed," most
sting as well as reverse sting operations are rendered ineffective.
While this strategy may insure that innocent persons are not en-
155 Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 459 (1932) (Roberts, J., concurring).
156 This second approach is consistent with Packer's "due process" model. Here,
government officials are viewed with skepticism and the justice system is seen as a series
of hurdles which must be cleared in order to secure any conviction. Freedom of the
citizenry is put above the need to control crime and the acts ofjustice system officials are
considered inherently suspect. PACKER, supra note 149, at 162.
157 This could be characterized as the reciprocal of "No Entrapment" (Type 1). En-
trapment would be available under any of the other three scenarios: "No Predisposi-
tion/Proper Government Conduct" (Type 2), "Predisposition/Improper Government
Conduct" (Type 3), and "Entrapment" (Type 4).
158 742 P.2d 1043 (N.M. 1987) (entrapment found where defendant sold drugs to an
undercover officer that were supplied by a government informant).
159 Id. at 1046.
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snared, it severely restricts the government's ability to ferret out
hidden crimes and criminals. For example, a Keith Jacobson, who
actively pursues the purchase and even production of child pornog-
raphy, can avoid criminal liability if the tactics which government
uses are suspect. Likewise, active drug dealers can escape prosecu-
tion if they happen to be caught in an impermissible reverse sting
operation. In addition, as criminals become more sophisticated,
government techniques to catch them must become more inventive.
The case of Keith Jacobson indicates the lengths to which agents
must go in order to attract attention.' 60
In the third strategy, the two approaches are melded together.
Two sub-categories currently exist in this area. The first is demon-
strated by the federal scheme where predisposition is viewed first,
and if found to be present, then impropriety (in the form of outra-
geous conduct) is examined. The problems presented by this strat-
egy are outlined above.' 6 1 The second category is manifested by the
system once adopted by Florida.
The Florida Supreme Court created a two-part test of entrap-
ment utilizing both the subjective (predisposition) and objective
(outrageous conduct) views in Cruz v. State.' 62 Conceptually, this
method places primary emphasis on government conduct and is
therefore primarily objective in nature. Unless a defendant can con-
vince the court that officials have acted improperly, the jury will
never get the opportunity to examine predisposition. Thus, re-
verse-sting cases, like that of Keith Jacobson, may never reach the
160 Although Jacobson's conviction was reversed by the Supreme Court, numerous
other cases involving child pornography were affirmed, primarily due to findings of pre-
disposition. See, e.g., United States v. Driscoll, 852 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1988); United States
v. Esch, 832 F.2d 531 (10th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 908, 991 (1988); United
States v. Gantzer, 810 F.2d 349 (2d Cir. 1987); United States v. Goodwin, 854 F.2d 33
(4th Cir. 1988); United States v. Hunt, 749 F.2d 1078 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472
U.S. 1018 (1985); United States v.Johnson, 855 F.2d 299 (6th Cir. 1988); United States
v. Moore, 916 F.2d 1131 (6th Cir. 1990); United States v. Musslyn, 865 F.2d 945 (8th
Cir. 1989); United States v. Nelson, 847 F.2d 285 (6th Cir. 1988); United States v. Ru-
bio, 834 F.2d 442 (5th Cir.' 1987); and United States v. Thoma, 726 F.2d 1191 (7th Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1228 (1984).
161 See supra notes 96-101 and accompanying text.
162 465 So. 2d 516, 521 (Fla.), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 905 (1985). In 1987, the Florida
State legislature may have derailed this attempt to combine the two approaches when it
established entrapment as a statutory defense. The law now provides that the defendant
must prove, by a preponderance of evidence, that law enforcement induced the commis-
sion of the crime through conduct "which created a substantial risk that such crime
[would] be committed by a person other than one who is ready to commit it." FLA. STAT.
ch. 771.201 (1992). This statute has been interpreted in various ways by the state appel-
late district courts. See Bowser v. State, 555 So. 2d 879 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989); Gon-
zales v. State, 571 So. 2d 1346 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990); and Krajewski v. State, LEXIS
2182 Mar. 13, 1991, Case No. 90-0703 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
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stage where the jury can determine if defendant was a proper target.
Even if the jury does receive the case, its review is restricted to an
examination of predisposition only. Non-predisposed defendants
who get swept up by a marginally improper scheme may never be
able to even offer an entrapment argument because the govern-
ment's conduct is deemed by the court to be insufficiently improper
to warrant review.
This article proposes a model proposed which combines the
two approaches and avoids the problems confronted by the other
alternatives. It bypasses the pitfalls found in New Jersey's strict ap-
proach of requiring proof of both defendant predisposition and
government misconduct. The model also stops short of the New
Mexico's liberal "either/or" position. In addition, it represents a
more reasoned and balanced approach than the mixed alternatives.
Unlike the current federal strategy, which favors predisposition over
"outrageous conduct," or the "old" Florida approach, that places
more importance on the review of government conduct than on the
proclivity of the accused, the proposal here attempts to truly balance
the two.
The proposed model, however, is not without its drawbacks.
First, the model places a major burden on the federal judiciary to
rule on entrapment matters heretofore not addressed. Judges must
make a determination as to whether government conduct was suffi-
ciently improper that it could lure an ordinary person into a scheme.
District courts could scuttle the balancing approach simply by set-
ting high standards for "outrageousness." If a defendant cannot
convince the court that the government acted inappropriately, then
the jury will never decide if the predisposition outweighed impropri-
ety. This type of court action would eventually result in a de facto
objective system where few decisions would be based on predisposi-
tion because most would turn on government conduct. Potential
problems with the judiciary, however, will likely be tempered by the
long legacy of the subjective approach which has been present in the
federal courts for decades. This could be buttressed by the strong
endorsement of this approach inJacobson.
This model also shoves the jury into the entrapment quagmire.
The members of the jury would have to wrestle with both predispo-
sition and "outrageousness," and would have to do so with little
historical guidance. A plethora of other, more technical, problems
would have to be addressed as well. Jury instructions would have to
be developed and tested in the courts; inconsistencies among the
circuits would have to be ironed out. Furthermore, adoption of this
model would require the overturning of caselaw that has developed
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over decades. These obstacles, however, can be overcome. When-
ever the Court institutes a major change, juries must be instructed
differently, inconsistencies arise and must be ironed out, and case
law must be overturned. However, these problems are less trouble-
some than maintenance of the currentJacobson doctrine.
The model proposed here provides a logical and workable an-
swer to many of the problems posed by entrapment in general, and
the reverse sting in particular. If implemented, the entrapment de-
fense could become an effective means of dealing with the thorny
problems associated with governmental attempts to handle major
criminal activities without the manufacturing of crime or engaging
in outrageous conduct.
IV. CONCLUSION
In its review of the entrapment defense and the reverse sting,
this article has demonstrated that the current method of dealing
with the problem is not only arduous, but also unworkable as it is
now structured. Presently, there are two fundamental approaches
to entrapment that have been adopted. The subjective approach fo-
cuses on the individual defendant to determine if there is evidence
of predisposition prior to involvement in a government-instigated
operation. The objective view looks strictly to the conduct of gov-
ernment officials and considers predisposition irrelevant. Under
this approach, if the conduct of government officials would have
lured the average person to commit a crime, then a defendant has
been entrapped and must be acquitted.
At the federal level, the courts use a two-step process to deal
with entrapment. First, the defendant's behavior is examined to de-
termine if there is evidence of predisposition to commit the crime.
If none is found, then the accused is acquitted based on entrapment.
When the court finds evidence of predisposition, entrapment is un-
available but the defendant may claim that the government's im-
proper actions violated due process. While this entrapment strategy
seems to work reasonably well with many types of law enforcement
designs, it presents problems with certain operations, such as re-
verse stings, where agents pose as sellers rather than buyers of illicit
goods and services.
The federal courts' approach reverse sting cases in a manner
similar to that taken in other entrapment situations. Once the de-
fendant's predisposition is established, the court reviews the gov-
ernment's conduct for "outrageousness." However, like non-
reverse sting cases, juries seldom acquit and circuits rarely reverse
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on the basis of entrapment. Furthermore, once predisposition has
been established, appellate courts are very reluctant to overturn de-
cisions because of government misconduct. Inasmuch as entrap-
ment is separated from the due process concerns of outrageous
conduct, a defendant must clear two hurdles in sequence to address
effectively the two issues of entrapment: predisposition and im-
proper government conduct. The problems evidenced by the fed-
eral approach are best understood in the context of the recent
decision ofJacobson v. United States.'63 In this case, the Court ruled
that the government must prove that a defendant was predisposed
to engage in a crime before becoming a target of an investigation.
Because the prosecution failed to do so in Jacobson's case, the
Court ruled that he was entrapped as a matter of law.
The issues raised by the federal approach, and exacerbated by
the reverse sting, may be illustrated by viewing two would-be of-
fenders who each have different fates depending on the approach
(subjective or objective) taken, but who should, at least theoreti-
cally, be treated in a uniform manner. The first is the "otherwise
innocent" person who, but for a government scheme that entices
involvement, would never commit the criminal offense at issue. The
second example is the career criminal, who is most undoubtedly
predisposed but is ensnared by a clearly improper reverse-sting op-
eration. The "otherwise innocent" avoids conviction under the sub-
jective (and federal) view but does not under the objective approach
because the government's action was proper. The career criminal is
not entrapped in the federal system (though it may be possible to
prove a due process violation) but is likely to escape conviction
under the objective approach despite the fact that this individual
would have engaged in the criminal conduct even without the im-
proper government conduct.
There are several ways out of this theoretical quagmire, all of
which involve some combination of the two approaches. First, en-
trapment could require both defendant predisposition and govern-
ment misconduct. This would promote consistency but also would
ensnare the "otherwise innocent" described above. Second, proof
of entrapment might hinge on either predisposition or "outrageous
conduct." This too would provide for congruous results but also
would allow the "career criminal" to escape prosecution.
The third avenue involves the melding of the two approaches,
and a specific model has been suggested here. The proposal entails
a three-step process. The first step involves a threshold require-
163 112 S. Ct. 1535 (1992).
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ment that the defendant convince the court that the government's
conduct was sufficiently questionable that an ordinary person might
be enticed to participate. The second includes a summary examina-
tion to determine if there is some evidence of predisposition. If evi-
dence of questionable government conduct and of the defendant's
predisposition is offered, the issue of entrapment can be presented
to the jury. Here, the jury weighs evidence of the government's
conduct against proof of the defendant's predisposition. The stan-
dard that would be applied is whether the defendant's participation
is more attributable to the government's conduct than to the ac-
cused individual proclivity to join the activity. If the defendant's in-
volvement is based more on the former (the government's conduct)
than on the latter (the predisposition of the accused), then entrap-
ment would have been proven.
This model, while not without its own drawbacks, provides a
balance between the two prevailing views. It also deals with some of
the principle concerns surrounding the defense. The model assists
in preventing the conviction of persons who are not "otherwise in-
nocent." However, it also provides a mechanism whereby the "ca-
reer criminal," who is not specifically predisposed, can be
successfully prosecuted. Finally, the model addresses the major
principles that are at the heart of the entrapment defense. It cir-
cumvents the encapsulation of persons not targeted by the specific
legislation in question. It does not promote the manufacture of
crime. Lastly, it does not endorse reprehensible government con-
duct. This proposal provides a workable alternative to the current
approaches to entrapment by balancing the major concerns in this
thorny area.
19931 1097
